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 3 
Introduction 
 
Abstract 
 
While current scholarship often points to a direct link between the ideology of Young 
Turks and the Kemalists, a closer analysis indicates there are many breaks in this 
link. This thesis analyzes the main influences on the Young Turk movement and the 
emergence and rise to power of the Kemalist movement, highlighting points of 
difference in the two movements’ ideologies and practices. Although the Young Turk 
movement influenced the Kemalist movement in the early years of the Turkish 
Republic, this thesis seeks to highlight the differences and discontinuities that 
existed between them. While many ideas from the Young Turk movement did carry 
over to the Kemalist movement, the extent and form of some of ideas differed.  
 
Scholars acknowledge that the Young Turk movement included numerous factions, 
whose ideology and practices differed greatly. Noticeable divides existed within the 
Young Turk movement, particularly between the movement’s leadership and its 
radical faction, the garbcilar. It is the ideology of the Young Turk leadership’s inner 
circle, the Central Committee, which is often compared with that of the Kemalists. 
However, many of the notable individuals who went on to lead and contribute to the 
ideology of the Kemalist movement were actually associated with the garbcilar and 
did not play a role in the Central Committee. In support of this argument, I will point 
to how the garbcilar, rather than the CUP central leadership, provided much of the 
inspiration for the radical aspects of Kemalist ideology and policies that prevailed in 
the early twentieth century.    
 
To be clear, this thesis does not seek to discredit or disprove current scholarship, but 
rather to present the relationship between the ideology of the Young Turk and 
Kemalist movements through a different lens. By tracing the ideological links of the 
Kemalists back to the Young Turk movement, this thesis will highlight the limits of 
ideological continuity. In doing so, it will contribute to the existing scholarly literature 
on Ottoman and early Turkish thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  
 
Chapter Outline 
 
Chapter One: The Late Ottoman Empire 
 
This thesis begins with a background on the late Ottoman Empire and the conditions 
that contributed to the growth of Ottoman opposition and identity formation in the late 
nineteenth century. Chapter One explores the factors that influenced the ideological 
currents of the Young Turk movement and the historical emergence of nationalist 
trends during the late Ottoman Empire. Chapter One then goes on to discuss the 
emergence of Ottoman opposition groups, particularly the development of the Young 
Turk movement, and the 1908 Young Turk Revolution.  
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Chapter Two: The Young Turk Era 
 
Following the 1908 Revolution, the Young Turk movement faced many challenges. 
This chapter begins by detailing some of these challenges and explaining the larger 
impact they had on the direction and ideology of the movement. Additionally, this 
chapter dissects the Young Turk movement by discussing its membership base, 
leadership and organizational structure. This chapter concludes with a discussion on 
the trending currents of ideological thought within the Young Turk movement and the 
main factors that influenced these trends. 
 
Chapter Three: Kemalists 
 
Chapter Three begins with an explanation of the fall of the CUP leadership and the 
rise of the Kemalist leadership. This chapter details the rise of Turkish nationalist 
movement during the late years of the Ottoman Empire and how the Kemalists, led 
by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, came to lead the Republic of Turkey. Additionally, this 
chapter outlines the demographic and ideological shifts that took place during the 
early years of the Turkish Republic and how the Kemalists enacted a series of rapid, 
ruthless reforms meant to capitalize on these changes.   
 
Chapter Four: In Comparison 
 
This thesis concludes with an analysis of additional examples of discontinuity in the 
ideology and practices of the Young Turk and Kemalist movements. This chapter 
includes comparisons on each movement’s stance on the following topics: 
embracing Western civilization; violence and forced assimilation; national identity; 
education and language; and secularism. Examples in this chapter seek to highlight 
the commonalities between the ideology of the garbcilar and the Kemalists.  
Literature Review 
 
There is no lack of scholarship on the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the 
Turkish Republic. The works of Erik Zürcher and M. Şükrü Hanioğlu alone provide 
ample information for a comparison between the Young Turk and Kemalist 
movements, as the two scholars have spent the much of their academic careers 
focusing on this topic. The works of other prominent scholars, such as Kemal Karpat, 
Selim Deringil, Uriel Heyd, Jacob Landau and Fatma Muge Göçek also provide 
unique insight on the changes and challenges of the late Ottoman Empire and early 
Turkish Republic. Göçek in particular does a wonderful job detailing the complicated 
interactions between the various ethnic and religious populations of the Ottoman 
Empire. Karpat’s work on the ideological shifts and factors that influenced Ottoman 
intellectual circles is also essential to the analysis of Young Turk and Kemalist 
thought. 
 
Prominent authors in the Ottoman-Turkish history field (such as Zürcher, Hanioğlu 
and Mardin) all discuss Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s place within the Young Turk 
movement and the influences of the Young Turk era on the Kemalist movement. This 
thesis does not seek to disprove these authors, but to reexamine where the 
Kemalists fit into the structure and ideology of the Young Turk movement by 
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approaching this subject from a different angle. By doing this, this thesis will more 
accurately trace the ideology of the Kemalists within the Young Turk movement. 
 
Current scholarship, especially from the above-mentioned authors, sufficiently shows 
the ideological links between the Young Turk and Kemalist movements. However, 
while available research focuses on the continuity between the two movements, it 
does not draw enough attention to many aspects of early Kemalist ideology and 
practices that originated from the Young Turk movement’s radical faction and 
differed from its core leadership. In drawing a line between the ideologies of each 
movement, this thesis will show that current scholarship often minimizes the precise 
origins of Kemalist ideas.  
 
When discussing the Young Turk movement’s ideology, practices, and evolution, 
most scholars acknowledge that the movement consists of various factions and 
groups, but still tend to refer to the Young Turks as one cohesive body. However, 
there were notable differences between the movement’s central leadership, its 
radical factions, and its lower-ranking membership.  While some authors differentiate 
between these groups and factions, this practice is not consistent across current 
scholarship. There is not consistent usage of terms like “Unionists”, “Liberals,” 
“Young Turks” and “CUP members.” This evidences the difficulty in separating these 
terms and identifying the boundaries between them. Zürcher and Hanioğlu, however, 
do give adequate attention to differentiations in terminology and both authors lay out 
how they use different terms in their writings.  
 
In addition to a review of secondary sources, this thesis reviews the writings of 
members of the Young Turk and Kemalist movements, such as Ziya Gökalp, 
Mustafa Kemal, Abdullah Cevdet, Yusuf Akçura, and Ahmed Rıza. While these 
sources are essential to a discussion on ideological currents during this time period, 
they often show bias and present inaccurate information. This is particularly true of 
Mustafa Kemal’s Nutuk, in which Kemal outlines a completely fictional narrative of 
the history of the Turkish Republic. These primary sources must therefore be 
carefully analyzed and biases must be noted. Despite such inaccuracies, these 
primary sources highlight the developments in the individuals’ thoughts and ideas 
throughout their lives.  
Methodology 
 
In addition to an extensive selection of secondary sources, this thesis focuses on an 
analysis of periodicals, journals (İctihad, Türk Yurdu, Türk), articles, speeches 
(Nutuk, Grand National Assembly, Turkish Republic anniversaries), and memoirs 
(Gökalp, Cevdet, Akçura, Kemal and others). 
 
Many materials analyzed for this thesis came from the private libraries of Boğaziçi 
University, Bilkent University, and Koç University as well as the public libraries of İBB 
Atatürk Kitaplığı (Atatürk Library), Milli Kütüphane Başkanlığı (National Library), Türk 
Tarih Kurumu (Turkish Historical Society), and TBMM Kütüphanesi (Library of 
Parliament).  
 
Primary source material used for this thesis was primarily in modern Turkish or 
Ottoman Turkish. Because of the language barrier with some sources, this thesis 
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also draws on primary source material cited in selected secondary sources. Many 
sources had translations available in English; those sources not available in English I 
either translated myself or enlisted the assistance of colleagues. 
 
Scope 
 
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries are arguably the most turbulent, conflicted, 
and complex in the entire history of Ottoman Empire. It is impossible for this thesis to 
cover all the factors that influenced the emergence and evolution of the Young Turk 
and Kemalist movements and their respective ideologies. However, this thesis seeks 
to highlight the major factors influencing these movements and points to outside 
sources where the reader can find additional information on selected topics.  
Chapter 1: The Late Ottoman Empire 
 
The late nineteenth century in the Ottoman Empire was a time of evolving ideas and 
practices, many of which focused on how to preserve the deeply troubled state. The 
Ottoman Empire faced economic, political and territorial challenges that many 
Ottoman officials believed could only be solved through a series of reforms.  The 
then ruling Hamidian regime took steps it believed would help the Empire catch up to 
Europe and ensure its longevity in the face of domestic threats. In doing so, the 
regime consolidated its power, which in turn led to many factors that fueled the 
emergence of opposition to the ruling regime.  
A Century of Change 
 
Implementation of the Tanzimat  
 
In the nineteenth century, the Ottoman central government began implementing a 
series of reforms aimed at advancing the Empire’s military, economy, and 
technology. The abolition of the Jannisaries in 1826 marked this new age of Ottoman 
reform led by Sultan Mahmud II called the Tanzimat. Ottoman military reforms in the 
eighteenth century, including the attempt by Selim III to create a modern army, had 
not produced the desired results of halting the Empire’s decline, and Ottoman 
leadership realized the urgency of taking additional steps to preserve the state.1 
 
In comparison to Western countries, Ottoman rulers believed the Empire was less 
advanced, particularly in these areas noted above. Ottoman rulers envied the 
perceived superiority of the West and sought to imitate its developments. The 
Ottomans also faced the domestic threat of increasingly autonomous minority 
communities who sought to break away from the Empire. In an attempt to close this 
gap with the West and secure the state, Ottoman Sultans—Mahmud II, Abdülmecid, 
Abdülaziz, and Abdulhamid II—implemented a series of reforms, which they believed 
would help repair the Empire. 
 
Issued in 1839 by Mahmud II’s successor Abdülmecid, the Gülhane Edict was one of 
the most important reforms of the Tanzimat era. The Edict promised security and 
 
1 Karpat, “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908.” p. 253-254. 
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equal rights to all the Empire’s subjects, regardless of their religious beliefs.2 In 
1856, Abuülmecid expanded upon the rights granted by the Gülhane Edict with the 
Imperial Reform Edict.3  The 1856 Edict received mixed reactions from Ottoman 
subjects and had a limited reach. As Karpat explains, 
 
The [1856] rescript declared equality in military service (which nobody liked), justice, schools 
(already Christian schools were far more advanced), abolished the head  tax, and provided 
equality of employment in government, though the implementation of all these measures was 
very limited.4  
 
Karpat adds that as an unintended consequence, granting ‘equality’ to Ottoman 
subjects increased the economic power of the Empire’s non-Muslim groups and 
indirectly contributed to their respective nationalist struggles.5  
 
The Tanzimat accelerated the centralization of the Empire that was already 
underway by bringing an end to the Empire’s millets. On a domestic level, 
centralization policies aimed to counter the threat of community leaders and 
rebellious elements.6 With the abolishment of the millets, the Ottoman state began 
handling the legal matters and taxation of the non-Muslim communities. This 
signaled the Ottoman central government’s attempt to exercise more control over all 
its subjects.  
 
Many of the policies enacted during the Tanzimat era pushed a state-molded idea of 
Ottoman citizenry to the Empire’s subject. These included the adoption of an 
Ottoman national anthem, Ottoman national flag and, for the first time, an official 
definition of Ottoman citizenship. This official definition of citizenship, outlined in the 
Nationality Law of 1869, did not reference religion.7 However, as Hanley notes, the 
development of this official definition of Ottoman affiliation focused primarily on 
acquisition and loss of nationality (rather than the rights and obligations that 
nationality conveyed).8   
 
The Empire’s modernization efforts prior to 1839 focused primarily on reforming the 
military, but the Tanzimat marked a change in the Empire’s strategy. At this point the 
Ottoman leadership began incorporating new social, administrative, and legal 
policies throughout the Empire.9 The Empire’s bureaucratic elite, intelligentsia and 
ulema felt a new social base was necessary for the Empire’s survival. Ottoman rulers 
also began to realize that they could not simply claim legitimacy and that they must 
redefine Ottoman citizenry. Through the enactment of Ottoman citizenry-related 
policies of the Tanzimat, the Ottoman state hoped to secure its grasp on the 
Empire’s subjects. These policies exemplified efforts by the Ottoman state to mold its 
subjects into loyal citizens.  
 
Emergence of Ottomanism 
 
2 Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism.” p. 778. 
3 “Edict of Reforms (Islâhat Fermani) (1856).”  
4 Karpat, “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908.” p. 259. 
5 Ibid. p. 259. 
6 Ibid. p. 253-259. 
7 Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism.” p. 778. 
8 Hanley, “What Ottoman Nationality Was and Was Not.” p. 277. 
9 Braude, “Foundation Myths of the Millet System.” p. 69-88. 
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With the implementation of the Tanzimat came the emergence of a state-endorsed 
identity, Ottomanism. The state’s promotion of Ottomanism was an attempt to unite 
the Empire’s many ethnic and religious groups, ensure allegiance from its subjects, 
and subdue any ‘nationalist and separatist enthusiasms’.10 Ottomanism centered on 
the creation of a shared identity for Ottoman citizens and its supporters believed it 
would turn the Empire’s population into citizens of the state. The Tanzimat marked 
the Empire’s first official shift towards the creation and promotion of a unified 
Ottoman identity. Part of this shift was the new use of the term ‘Ottoman’. Prior to the 
Tanzimat era, ‘Ottoman’ described the Empire’s ruling circle and elites. During the 
Tanzimat era, the Ottoman government began using the term ‘Ottoman’ to describe 
all the Empire’s subjects in an attempt to eliminate the distinctions between the 
rulers and ruled.11 
 
Under the banner of Ottomanism, the state allowed non-Muslim communities to 
maintain their individual languages, customs, and religions so long as they were 
loyal to the Empire. The state hoped to use Ottomanism to create a “separate but 
equal” environment that allowed the state to exercise more control of non-Muslim 
communities. 12  However, the state encountered barriers to creating this new 
environment.   
 
Despite its attempt to create a cohesive identity among the Empire’s inhabitants, the 
state’s reforms led to amplified divisions along religious and ethnic lines. Ottomanism 
became a failed attempt by the state to create a common political identity that 
superseded faith, ethnicity and language. The dissolution of the millet system, in 
particular, led to a number of unintended consequences.13 However, even though 
the government did not achieve its intended goal with Ottomanism the concept still 
had a deep impact on the formation of identities within the Empire. Instead of 
creating unity among the Empire’s citizens, Ottomanism instead increased 
awareness of the religious, ethnic and linguistic divides in Ottoman society. 
 
The government attempted to use Ottomanism to bypass the existing ethnic and 
religious loyalties of the Empire’s non-Muslim groups. Karpat argues that this 
strategy did not produce the desired effects since it lacked an emotional appeal. 
Instead, it appealed to Muslim intellectuals who “seized upon Ottomanism as a 
nationalist ideology of their own and defined its content according to their own 
cultural-social background and interpretation of history.”14 
 
As the Empire’s religious ratio continued to shift in favor of the Muslim population, 
the concept of a multinational Ottoman state based on shared citizenship no longer 
held the same value for the state. In line with this development, the Ottoman state 
shifted its focus to solidifying the unity of its dominant population as a strategy to 
ensure its survival. In line with this strategy, Abdülhamid II put heavy emphasis on 
 
10 Fuad Pasha, one of the Empire’s more notable elites at this time. Quoted in Davison, “Turkish 
Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth-Century.” p. 852. 
11 Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism. p. 140. 
12 Ibid. p. 140-141. 
13 Ceylan, “The Millet System in the Ottoman Empire.” p. 259-261. 
14 Karpat, “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908.” p. 261. 
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the Empire’s Islamic qualities in an attempt to gather loyalty and support from Muslim 
subjects.15  
 
Dissolution of Millet System 
 
In the pre-Tanzimat era, religious pluralism was a key characteristic of Ottoman 
society. Under the millet system, religious communities lived separately yet still 
interacted and cooperated with one another.16  Braude describes the millets “not as 
an institution or even a group of institutions, but rather a set of arrangements, largely 
local, with considerable variation over time.”17 These ‘arrangements’ between the 
Ottoman central government and non-Muslim communities allowed the millets to 
exercise a certain degree of autonomy and contributed to the continuation of 
individual languages, traditions, customs, and religious practices.18 
 
The Empire’s non-Muslim Ottoman subjects organized themselves into three distinct 
millets: Greek Orthodox, Armenians, and Jews. Under this millet arrangement these 
communities lived alongside the Muslim communities and had recognition, but not 
equality. This differentiation allowed the non-Muslim communities to preserve their 
diversity and identities. 19  Ottoman policies of tolerance towards non-Muslim 
communities through the millet concept created an environment where a degree of 
coexistence was a practical and political possibility. This space of coexistence 
allowed the various religious and ethnic communities of the Empire to “recognize and 
adapt to the inevitability of difference.”20 In a conversation on this topic, Baer and 
Makdisi say the state’s tolerant policies were a strategy the Ottomans employed to 
manage the Empire’s religious and ethnic groups. As part of this strategy, the central 
government allowed non-Muslims a degree of autonomy but not full equality, thereby 
controlling the extent to which non-Muslim subjects could manifest their difference. 
The Ottoman state therefore tolerated these groups while simultaneously 
discriminating against them.21    
 
The primary concern of Ottoman officials in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries was 
to maintain the status quo, that is, the superiority of Muslims over non-Muslims. 
While the millet system had once allowed the Ottoman state to ensure this status 
quo, the gradual rise in status of non-Muslim communities meant the state was 
losing its control over the Empire’s social hierarchy. The Ottoman Muslims, who had 
long held the top positions, faced a new environment where non-Muslim 
 
15 Deringil, “The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire.” p. 12.  
16 The meaning of the term millet changed throughout the late centuries of the Ottoman Empire. In the 
pre-Tanzimat era, Ottomans used the term when referencing the legal systems of the Empire’s non-
Muslim communities. Over time, the term came to symbolize “nation.” Braude, “Foundation Myths of 
the Millet System.” p. 65-86. 
17 He also argues that the millets were a myth, since there was no official administration of non-
Muslims until the nineteenth century. Ibid. p. 83. 
18 Davison, “The Millets as Agents of Change in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire.” p. 319-
329. 
19 Braude, “Foundation Myths of the Millet System.” p. 69-70. 
20 Baer cautions against using the word coexistence to describe inter-relations as it suggests equality 
between groups. In the Empire certain groups were legally subordinated to others. Baer, Makdisi, and 
Shryock, "Tolerance and Conversion in the Ottoman Empire: A Conversation." p. 929. 
21 Ibid. p. 930. 
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communities dominated many sections of the Empire’s economy such as trade, 
industry, and finance. 22 
 
Davison argues Ottoman non-Muslim millets played a decisive role in the 
introduction of Western-style reforms to Empire by acting as vehicles of change. In 
particular, Davison points to the non-Muslim millets’ contact with European powers, 
their role in importing the printing press to the Empire, and the number of Western 
missionary schools established in their communities.23 These factors helped the non-
Muslim millets noticeably improve their levels of wealth and education, gaining a 
superior status to the Muslim majority. As these millets became increasingly 
independent, the Empire sought to redefine how its inhabitants interacted with each 
other. As a way to restrict the growing power and influence of the millets, the 
Ottoman government moved to dissolve the system by eliminating the distinctions 
between Muslim and non-Muslim communities.24  
 
Sectarian Violence  
 
While the millet system organized the Empire’s religious communities on the basis of 
inequality, these communities had a certain level of independence. For example, 
since each religious community conducted its own administration, each also had its 
own legal system. The abolishment of the millet concept also meant the abolishment 
of each religious community’s legal system.25  The government’s decision to bestow 
equality on the Empire’s inhabitants was therefore not a welcome change. The 
Tanzimat reorganized the millets so it was no longer religion that determined one’s 
place in the Ottoman hierarchy. This caused problems on both sides. The non-
Muslim millets felt content with their previous social and economic status and now 
the Muslim millets became angered by their new, equal status with individuals over 
whom they had long had superiority. Among its unintended consequences, the 
disintegration of the millet system directly contributed to the rise of sectarian conflicts 
within the Empire.26 
 
In the nineteenth century the Empire’s economic and social environment shifted in 
favor of the non-Muslim communities. Karpat argues that centralization policies, 
more than any other measures initiated during the early nineteenth century, were 
instrumental in shifting the balance of Ottoman social, economic, and political 
relations. 27 This new environment prompted a shift in the interactions of Muslims 
and non-Muslims and in the view of the Ottoman state towards non-Muslim 
communities. While the Muslims once held a prestigious economic position in the 
Empire, they began to doubt their superiority over non-Muslims and believe the non-
Muslims communities had certain advantages. Muslims began to feel threatened by 
not only the loss of the Empire, but also the loss of their superior status within the 
Empire.28  
 
22 Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism. p. 7. 
23 Davison, “The Millets as Agents of Change in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire.” p. 319-
337. 
24 Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876. p. 388. 
25 Ceylan, “The Millet System in the Ottoman Empire.” p. 259-263. 
26 Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism. p. 130-134. 
27 Karpat, “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908.” p. 251-256. 
28 Ibid. p. 245-246. 
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Exposure to Western and Russian trade in the late eighteenth century, along with 
territorial losses, led to the downfall of one of the Empire’s biggest economic bases, 
the Black Sea.  This downward economic trend continued into the following century, 
pushing the Ottoman state to the brink of collapse. Karpat points out that the 
consequences of this deteriorating economic situation did not affect all subjects of 
the Empire at the same time or with the same intensity. 29 Under these economic 
conditions a new middle class arose consisting predominately of non-Muslims. The 
socio-economic advancement of non-Muslims forced Muslims out of their positions 
of superiority and prestige. As this non-Muslim middle class expanded, the Muslim 
middle class continued to shrink. This forced Muslim middle-class subjects into less 
important jobs and weakened their role in the Ottoman economy.30 
 
Rising fears in the Muslim community stemming from this trend led to violent 
outbursts by Muslims against Christians and Jews during the nineteenth century in 
places such as Aleppo, Mosul, Nablus, Jeddah, Egypt, Lebanon and Baghdad. This 
sectarian violence signaled a larger communal rupture taking place in Ottoman 
society.31  It also enhanced European perceptions of Muslim intolerance towards 
non-Muslims and led to deteriorating sectarian tensions.32   
 
Muslims began associating Christians with the social, economic, and cultural 
changes taking place in the Empire. An increase in the economic status of the 
Christian community became apparent with the construction of new homes and 
churches. Muslim beliefs that the Christians were overtaking their role as the 
Empire’s dominant group spurred feelings of anger and fear. Muslims saw advances 
in the Christian community as setbacks for their own community. Christians also 
shared their faith with European powers, which led to their frequent identification with 
the West in the minds of many Muslims. According to Masters, Christians also began 
to display a growing political assertiveness, which further contributed to Muslim fears 
that Christians were overtaking them in the social, political, and economic hierarchy 
of the Empire. Christian links to the West enhanced their political confidence as they 
received increased support from European officials and missionaries. Masters 
argues that it was this increase in political confidence, rather than the wealth or faith 
of the Christians, which led to a growth in social distance between the Empire’s 
Muslim and Christian communities.33   
 
The Missionary Threat 
 
During the Tanzimat period, Western powers increasingly intervened on behalf of the 
non-Muslim populations of the Empire. These interventions not only created 
difficulties in carrying out many of the Tanzimat era reforms but also had a lasting 
impression on many of Ottoman subjects, particularly those who were already 
disillusioned with the state of the Empire.  
 
 
29 Ibid. p. 244-246. 
30 Ibid. p. 250. 
31 Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism. p. 130. 
32 Ibid. p. 134. 
33 Ibid. p. 194. 
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Western intervention came in many forms, one of which was the widespread 
presence of missionaries in the Empire. Missionary work began in late 1820s and 
gradually became a systematic, large-scale activity throughout the nineteenth 
century. 34  Missionary activity gained momentum in the 1880s and 1890s and 
reached its peak during that time.35 Missionary activities in the Empire concentrated 
mostly on non-Protestant Christian subjects, among them the Greeks and 
Armenians.36 Through missionary activities Europeans had an indirect, unanticipated 
impact on the politicization of religious identities in the Ottoman Empire. Competition 
among the European powers for influence via missionary activities also impacted 
religious identities.37  
 
As missionary activity gained momentum during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II 
the relationship between the Empire and the missionaries became one of “mutual 
suspicion and dislike.” Abdülhamid II himself referred to missionaries in the Empire 
as “the most dangerous enemies to the social order.”38 As Deringil describes, the 
Ottoman state linked the threat of missionaries directly to the survival of the state: 
 
“None of the challenges to the legitimacy of the Ottoman state, and all it stood for, was more 
dangerous in the long term than that posed by missionary activity. The threat posed by the 
solider, the diplomat, the merchant, all had to do with the here and now; the missionaries 
through their schools, constituted a danger for the future.”39 
 
The Ottomans believed the missionaries undermined efforts to legitimize the basis of 
their rule.40 Ottoman opposition to missionary activities focused particularly on the 
influence of missionary-run schools and the printing press. 41  However, the 
missionary problem was only one of many threats to Ottoman efforts legitimize their 
rule and safeguard the Empire. Missionaries had protections from colonial powers, 
introduced modern medicine, brought with them the printing press, and established a 
wide network of schools and churches. The missionaries’ possession of scientific 
knowledge and Western technology also distinguished them from Ottoman 
subjects.42 Missionaries portrayed themselves as representatives of modernity and 
superior culture. 43 In this way missionaries extended the reach of European cultural 
and political influences.  
 
Ottoman Education and Intelligentsia 
 
 
34 Erhan, “Ottoman Official Attitudes Towards American Missionaries.” p. 317.  
35 Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman 
Empire, 1876-1909. p. 114. 
36 Erhan, “Ottoman Official Attitudes Towards American Missionaries.” p. 319. 
37 Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism. p. 152. 
38 Salt, “A Precarious Symbiosis: Ottoman Christians and the Foreign Missionaries in the Nineteenth 
Century.” p. 56 
39 Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman 
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The influx of missionaries to the Ottoman Empire also stimulated the growth of 
religious and educational activities in many non-Muslim communities. The Ottomans 
understood that the only way to effectively compete with the high-quality education of 
the missionaries was to provide viable alternatives of equal quality. 44  However, 
foreign schools in many Ottoman provinces preceded the establishment of Ottoman 
schools and therefore set the standard for quality of education in the area. This belief 
that education could help the Empire overcome its missionary threat helped fuel the 
expansion of the Ottoman education system, which was already underway. The 
Ottoman education system sought to rival that of European missionaries, 
neighboring states, and non-Muslim minorities. This expansion of the Ottoman 
education became a defensive weapon against the emerging threats to the integrity 
of the Empire.45 
 
In areas not heavily populated by missionaries, Ottomans worried about schools built 
by neighboring, nationalist-minded states and non-Muslim minorities.46 A rise in the 
level of non-Muslims’ education had not gone unnoticed by Muslims or the Ottoman 
central government. By the nineteenth century Ottoman authorities had come to 
believe non-Muslim minority-run schools were superior to state-run schools.47 This 
accelerated the state’s establishment and expansion of Ottoman schools.  
 
Not only the quality but also the quantity of non-state schools state worried the 
Ottomans. European powers built more schools than the Ottoman government, and 
they built them faster. They also had more money to fund these schools.48 Already 
by 1894 there were 4,547 minority-run schools and 413 foreign-run schools in the 
Ottoman Empire.49 This had a dramatic impact on the number of Ottoman Muslims 
versus non-Muslims receiving their education in these schools, which led to a steady 
increase in the attendance of Ottoman minority students throughout the nineteenth 
century.  
 
Improved and expanded education was a conscious, deliberate response to the 
threat that Ottoman territories faced. The central government believed the Empire 
was increasingly susceptible to instability tied to the presence of missionaries, 
activities of Ottoman minority groups, and the influence of outside powers. In its 
attempt to counter these perceived threats the state produced an entirely new 
version of education, one that fused Islamic values and Western methods. A shift 
towards this version of education occurred under the leadership of the Hamidian 
regime. During that time the state used a more selective approach of adapting 
Western models and institutions. An underlying Ottoman belief that the secret of the 
West’s success could be adapted to Ottoman circumstances guided this shift. Fortna 
refers to this as an “Ottomanized version of Western-style education.”50 Instead of 
only adopting the Western methods as they were, the Ottoman state blended 
 
44 Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman 
Empire, 1876-1909. p. 133. 
45 Deringil, “The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire.” p. 17. 
46 Fortna, Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire. p. 8-9, 45. 
47 Ibid. p.  44-45. 
48 Ibid. p. 54. 
49 Among the European countries building schools in the Empire France was the leader with 115 
schools (in 1894). Göçek, “Ethnic Segmentation, Western Education and Political Outcomes: 
Nineteenth Century Ottoman Society.” P. 524. 
50 Fortna, Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire. p. 9-10. 
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Western and Ottoman traditions to create an education system that fit its needs. 
Fortna argues that this style of education contributed to a shift in the way Ottomans 
perceived themselves, their place in the world, and their relationship with the state 
and its various communities. 51  
 
The expansion of the education system did not lead to the emergence of an Ottoman 
intelligentsia, but it did accelerate its development. The establishment of Western-
styled schools was instrumental in the advancement of Ottoman intellectual thought.  
However, changes to the Ottoman social and economic landscape had wider 
reaching effects on the Ottoman mindset. As the Ottoman education system 
expanded and improved throughout the nineteenth century, the resulting changes 
mostly affected larger Ottoman towns and cities. However, the new class of 
intelligentsia that arose during the Hamidian period came from Ottoman provincial 
towns. Unlike the Young Ottoman intelligentsia before them, members of the 
Hamidian-era intelligentsia often belonged to the lower-ranking strata of the 
population as opposed to the middle and upper levels of Ottoman bureaucracy. 
According to Karpat, this indicates that the rise in Hamidian-era intelligentsia 
stemmed more from the increased social and economic status of provincial Ottoman 
towns.52  
 
Ottoman intelligentsia not only expanded under the reign of Abdülhamid II, but also 
developed into a politically significant group. The establishment of professional 
schools helped create conditions that filtered the rising group of intelligentsia and 
contributed to their development into a group of political elites. New avenues of 
communication also helped accelerate the rise of Ottoman intelligentsia and played a 
decisive role in fostering ideological discussions. This began in the mid-nineteenth 
century with the introduction of the postal system, telegraph, railways, and modern 
press. The establishment of the press, in particular, had a drastic impact on the 
emergence, spread and development of ideas, as it allowed information to reach 
larger numbers of people in the Empire.53 
 
Defining ‘Turk’ 
 
Ergul’s review of Ottoman documents indicates that the term ‘Turk’ was well known 
among Ottoman subjects but that there was no clear definition for the term. There 
was therefore much ambiguity about who was a ‘Turk’.54 The majority of Ottomans 
did not self-identify as Turks despite recognizing the Turkish nature of the Ottoman 
ruling class and language.55 However, non-Muslim community leaders did call the 
Ottoman bureaucracy “Turkish” and believed that the Ottoman state was already a 
Turkish state.56 
 
Through the mid-nineteenth century the Empire’s bureaucrats identified themselves 
as ‘Ottomans’ or ‘Muslims’, not ‘Turks’, a term which they used to differentiate 
between ethnic groups or as a derogatory reference to peasants or nomads in 
 
51 Ibid. p. 19-20. 
52 Karpat, “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908.” p. 275-279. 
53 Ibid. p. 261. 
54 Ergul, The Ottoman Identity: Turkish, Muslim or Rum? p. 634. 
55 Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism.” p. 774. 
56 Karpat, “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908.” p. 249. 
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Anatolia.57 The inhabitants of Anatolia, often referred to as ‘Turkmen’, were thought 
by most Ottomans to be ‘boorish’ and ‘rough’. The term ‘Turk’ referenced these 
characteristics. This negative connotation of the term ‘Turk’ prevailed among the 
Ottoman elites and particularly in larger cities, such as Istanbul.58 Lewis notes that, 
“To apply it to an Ottoman gentleman of Constantinopolis would have been an 
insult.”59 
 
In the span of one century the meaning of ‘Turk’ changed drastically. Makdisi 
summarizes this change below: 
 
…from the old regime meaning of an imperial elite that disparaged the common “Turk,” to a 
secular Tanzimat legal citizenship and official discourse of patriotic Osmanlilik that included 
all Ottoman subjects, to a more ambiguous, more romantic, more exclusivist late Ottoman 
meaning that ennobled the “Turk.60 
  
Kusher attributes this shift in meaning to a number of ‘inspirational factors’. Firstly, 
the members of the ethnic-Turkish educated class had close contact with nationalism 
through education and personal contacts with other Turkic peoples from outside the 
Empire. They also had accessibility to an abundance of literature being published on 
the Turks, Turkish language, and Turkish history during the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. The emergence of Turcology studies and the expansion of 
available scholarly works on the field also contributed to a shift in terminology. 
Changing political and social circumstances in the Empire, coupled with these 
‘inspirational factors’ helped formulate new opinions on what it meant to be a 
‘Turk’.61  
 
The Western world’s use of the term ‘Turk’ and its perceptions of the Ottoman state 
changed as well. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe there existed 
multiple, diverse, and inconsistent ideas of ‘Turks’ formed in part by travellers’ 
experiences in the Ottoman Empire. By the eighteenth century these perceptions 
shifted to focus on scholarly writings of European authors who presented a coherent, 
consistent, and often negative view of the Turks.62 Ergin notes that negative images 
of Turks and the Ottoman Empire became so entrenched over time that, “Westerners 
in the first half of the twentieth century who questioned these images upon closer 
contact with Turkey presented their change in opinion as a radical conversion.”63  
 
These negative perceptions of the Turks led in part to the Ottomans becoming 
increasingly preoccupied with their public image, particularly in the nineteenth 
century. This contributed to the rise of what Deringil describes as “Ottoman image 
management,” which he says was one of many efforts to simultaneously defend and 
unite the Empire.64 Ottoman uneasiness over the Empire’s public image stemmed in 
 
57 Kushner, “Self-Perception and Identity in Contemporary .” p. 219. 
58 Ergul, “The Ottoman Identity: Turkish, Muslim or Rum? p. 634. 
59 Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey. p. 1-2. 
60 Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism.” p. 792. 
61 Kushner, “Self-Perception and Identity in Contemporary Turkey.” p. 220-221. 
62 Cirakman, From the ‘Terror of the World’ to the ‘Sick Man of Europe’: European Images of Ottoman 
Empire and Society from the Sixteenth Century to the Nineteenth. Cited in Ergin, “‘Is the Turk a White 
Man?’ Towards a Theoretical Framework for Race in the Making of Turkishness.” p. 826. 
63 Ergin, “‘Is the Turk a White Man?’ Towards a Theoretical Framework for Race in the Making of 
Turkishness.” p. 836. 
64 Deringil, “The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire.” p. 5-6. 
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part from concerns over missionary activity in the Empire. The Ottomans believed 
that the missionaries fueled anti-Ottoman sentiments in the Western press by using 
phrases like “Terrible Turk.”65 Negative references, such as “unspeakable Turk” or 
“sick man of the East,” prompted Ottoman statesmen to actively project a positive 
image abroad. Ottomans saw this task as essential to the Empire’s survival and 
legitimacy.66  
 
Emergence of Ottoman Opposition  
 
Hamidian Era 
 
The gradual disintegration of the Ottoman state coincided with a rising need for a 
new solution Empire’s challenges. Centralizing reforms, beginning with Selim III, 
began as an attempt by the Ottoman state to salvage itself and later as an attempt to 
control the Empire’s subjects and status quo. Abdülhamid II maintained the dominant 
trends of the Tanzimat, particularly centralization, but also shifted towards a more 
“Islamic-styled official nationalism.” A drive for Muslim unity was one of the distinctive 
characteristics of the Hamidian period. Abdülhamid II emphasized Muslim unity by 
capitalizing on pre-existing trends and pan-Islamic sentiments.67 This shift began 
after the Empire’s loss of the Balkan Christian provinces during the Russian-Ottoman 
War of 1877-1878.68  
 
Under the leadership of Abdülhamid II a small circle of handpicked individuals 
exploited power. Political participation remained limited to close associates and 
supporters of the Sultan and his inner circle. In an attempt to further consolidate his 
power Abdülhamid II suspended the Ottoman constitution in 1878, which sought to 
place a check on his powers. He had approved the constitution in 1876, just two 
years before. Afterwards, some Ottomans intellectuals began expressing their 
opposition to Abdülhamid II and his policies. In response to the mounting criticism 
against him, Abdülhamid II resorted to violent measures to silence his opponents, 
often exiling, jailing, and even assassinating them. The regime also engaged in 
espionage practices as a way of monitoring and preventing opposition.69  
 
The widespread corruption, oppression and absolutist rule of the Hamidian regime, 
along with the continued deterioration of economic, social, and military conditions in 
the Empire, directly contributed to the emergence of Ottoman opposition groups in 
the late nineteenth century. This began with the Young Ottoman group, which 
emerged in 1865 with the goal of saving the Empire from Western encroachment 
and internal decay by modernizing Ottoman state and society.70 Though different in 
much of its structure and ideology, the Young Ottoman movement of the Tanzimat 
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era laid much of the groundwork for the Young Turk opposition movement that later 
appeared.  
 
The Rise of Opposition 
 
The important role Western-styled education played in the rise of Ottoman opposition 
sentiments should not be understated. The nineteenth century in particular saw an 
increase in the number of these schools in the Empire. Newly established schools 
modeled on ones in the West included:  Mektub-i Mulkiye (Civil Service 
Academy/School of Administration); Mektub-i Harbiye (War Academy); Bahriye 
(Naval Academy); Mektub-i Tibbiyeyi Askeriye (Military Medical Academy); Mektub-i 
Baytariyet (Veterinary School); Mektub-i Bahriye (Naval Academy); and Topçu 
Muhendishane Mektub-i (Artillery and Engineering School). Many of these schools 
had teachers who received some degree of Western-style education and some were 
former supporters of the Young Ottoman movement.71  
 
The first members of the Young Turk opposition movement were students attending 
the Empire’s Military Medical Academy in Istanbul. These students founded a secret 
society in 1889, which they named the Society of Ottoman Union (Ittihad-i Osmani 
Cemiyeti). At the time this group only had a few members: Ibrahim Temo, Abdullah 
Cevdet, Ishak Sukuti and Cerkez Mehmet Resit.72 The Society’s initial goal centered 
on ending Hamidian rule and reinstating the 1876 Ottoman Constitution and 
Parliament. In the years following its emergence the Society slowly gained the 
support of more students, particularly those in the Empire’s newly established 
schools and Western-style military academies. It then opened new branches 
throughout the Empire. The Society also established links with Ottoman citizens 
living in European countries, such as Ahmed Rıza, a prominent Ottoman intellectual 
who later became a leading member of the Young Turk movement in Paris.  
 
As the organization continued to expand it drew increased attention from the Sultan, 
leading to the arrest and exile of some of its members by police and the escape of 
others to Europe. In the late 1890s the Young Turk movement gained strength in 
Europe, and particularly in Paris. During this time opposition within the Empire 
remained largely confined to secrecy and subject to oppression from the Sultan. The 
Young Turk movement continued to gain strength in the Empire, albeit underground. 
Two main factors aided this expansion: word of mouth and the circulation of illegally 
distributed journals and papers.73 
 
A common belief that the Ottoman Empire was falling behind and struggling for 
survival guided the evolution of the Young Turk movement during the late nineteenth 
century.74  During this time the Young Turk movement developed in two distinct 
ways: as an unstructured intellectual movement of opposition to Hamidian rule and 
as an umbrella group of individually organized groups and societies. In 1894 the 
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Society of Ottoman Union renamed itself as the Ottoman Committee of Union and 
Progress (Osmanlı Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti), or the CUP. By the late 1800s the 
CUP had become an umbrella organization for the Empire’s opponents of Hamidian 
regime. However, the membership of the CUP, while united by the common goal of 
ending Hamidian rule and reinstating the constitution, differed on other political and 
ideological topics.75 
 
The CUP remained an umbrella organization through the 1908 Young Turk 
Revolution. A major part of the CUP’s success in carrying out the 1908 Revolution 
was its ability to exist as a larger umbrella organization that acted on behalf of many 
smaller groups united by a single goal. However, following the Revolution there was 
no longer a single goal that unified the organizations under the CUP’s umbrella. 
Many of the groups under the CUP felt they had achieved their goal and no longer 
saw a need to continue their activities under the CUP. Others believed that the CUP 
should exit the political scene and “leave the business of government to those who 
knew the job,” since the majority of the CUP’s members lacked experience in 
government positions.76 Accordingly, these groups broke away from the umbrella of 
the CUP.  
 
The Young Turks 
 
Is it appropriate to call our committee the “Young Turk Committee”? Surely not… 
- Ahmed Rıza 77 
 
The term ‘Young Turk’ first surfaced in Europe as a way to describe the Ottomans 
opposed Abdülhamid II’s policies and practices and who worked towards the 
restoration of the Ottoman Empire. The term reflected European beliefs that these 
individuals were young and predominately Turkish. However, this term was 
misleading since many of those involved in the Young Turk movement were not 
ethnic Turks. Ironically, among the founding members of the Young Turk movement 
mentioned above, none were ethnically Turkish. The movement’s founders actually 
had roots in the Russian Caucasus, the Albanian areas in the Western Balkan region 
of the Ottoman Empire, and Kurdistan.78 The term ‘Young Turk’ best describes the 
military officers that joined the movement in years leading up to the 1908 Revolution. 
These individuals were on average 29 years old and of ethnic Turkish descent, fitting 
the literal description of ‘Young Turks’.  
 
In the early years of the movement the CUP leadership consisted mostly of 
individuals who possessed post-secondary education. The Ottoman intellectuals of 
the Young Turk movement saw themselves as members of an elite group, despite 
the fact that no official organization of individuals existed. The majority of them 
received their education as medical doctors. Even though many of them trained in 
military institutions, none of them had actively served in the Ottoman army. 79  
 
 
75 Ergil, “A Reassessment: The Young Turks, Their Politics and Anti-Colonial Struggle.” p. 27. 
76 Ahmad, “The Young Turk Revolution.” p. 24. 
77 “Isim Mes’elesi,” Sura-yi Ummet (May 1, 1904). No. 52. 
78 Bayar, Formation of the Turkish Nation-State, 1920-1938. p. 26.  
79 Zürcher, The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Ataturk’s 
Turkey. p. 97-98. 
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Although some Young Turk members did not identify as ethnically Turkish, they still 
proceeded to use the term ‘Turk’ when identifying themselves. They used this term in 
a proud, elitist way, as within the Ottoman intellectual circles the term ‘Turk’ had 
shifted to indicate positive traits and exclusivity. In newspapers and reviews 
published in European countries members of the Young Turks often called 
themselves as ‘Turks’ as a reference to their political identity.80 Zürcher also points 
out that the Young Turk leadership also used this term when describing themselves, 
particularly while living in Europe. 81  
 
Both Hanioğlu and Kayali highlight the challenges of understanding and using the 
term ‘Young Turk’: 
  
The vague and inaccurate use of the term Young Turk, especially in the writings of non-
Turkish scholars, has created confusion, because many activities have been falsely attributed 
to the Young Turks. There were many independent groups working in the Ottoman Empire 
against the regime of Abdülhamid II and only some of these had dealings with the Young 
Turks.82 
 
An unfortunate misnomer, because it implies that the group of liberal constitutionalists called 
the Young Turks consisted exclusively of Turks, of even of Turkish nationalists. The Young 
Turks, in fact, included in their many ranks Arabs, Albanians, Jews, and in the early stages of 
the movement, Armenians and Greeks.83 
 
Berkes, another prominent scholar on the Ottoman-Turkish transition era, refers to 
the ‘Young Turks’ as a mix of “persons, associations, and parties which actually used 
other and different names in Turkish, and which represented often opposite views.”84 
In his own writings, Berkes uses the term ‘Young Turks’ to denote those individuals 
who opposed the Hamidian regime politically, though he points out that these 
individuals often had opposing ideologies despite their unity in Hamidian opposition. 
 
A Young Turk Revolution 
 
In 1896 Abdülhamid II’s secret police uncovered a coup d’état plan, which led to the 
exile of many of the Young Turk movement’s earliest members. This resulted in the 
remaining Empire-based members of the movement taking their activities further 
underground. During this time, the Young Turk movement was far from united and 
was divided into numerous factions. Its members only had loose connection and 
communication with each other. However, in the years that followed these factions 
began to attract more attention from like-minded individuals who also aspired to save 
the crumbling Ottoman Empire. As membership began to increase, so did the 
communication and organization between the various factions located in the Empire 
and elsewhere.  
 
In an effort to unify the various Ottoman opposition groups that had emerged in the 
late nineteenth century the First Congress of Ottoman Opposition convened in 1902. 
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However, no alliance came about after the First Congress. After the 1902 congress 
the Young Turk movement increased its membership, but also the divides among its 
membership. As Zürcher notes, these divisions “ran deep and were to play a part in 
the politics” between the 1908 revolution and the years leading up to WWI. 85 It was 
not until after the Second Congress of Ottoman Opposition in 1907 that the Young 
Turks joined forces with other opposition movements to create the CUP. Until this 
point the CUP was solely an intellectual movement, spreading their ideas by 
distributing pamphlets, newspapers, and journals and holding meetings. However, 
once the Europe-based CUP began to join forces with other opposition movements 
in the Empire it took on a new, revolutionary momentum.86  
 
This marked a turning point in the pre-1908 Revolution phase of the Young Turk 
movement. After this, the integration of the Salonika-based Ottoman Freedom 
Society (Osmanli Hurriyet Cemiyeti) brought in many army officers from the Balkan 
provinces of the Empire. These members became an important component of the 
CUP’s membership, as it was these officers who went on to carry out the 
revolution.87  
 
Many members of the Young Turk movement still lived in Europe at the time of the 
Revolution. The army officers living in the Empire therefore played the key roles in 
the 1908 Young Turk Revolution. At the time of the Revolution the CUP had 
approximately 2,000 members, two-thirds of which were military officers.88 These 
military officers carried out a carefully planned Revolution against Abdülhamid II that 
resulted in reinstating the Ottoman constitutions and the dismissal of many 
individuals from the Hamidian regime.   
Chapter 2: The Young Turk Era 
Post-Revolution Challenges 
 
After the 1908 Revolution the Young Turk movement faced the challenge of 
rebranding itself from a revolutionary movement into a political party. Though many 
members attained high levels of education, the majority lacked experience in the 
Ottoman administration and had little idea about how to run a government. Among 
the movement’s leaders, none had previously held a political position.  The 
movement also saw many groups under the CUP umbrella organization break away 
once the Revolution took place. This led to multiple shifts in the CUP’s organizational 
structure, membership base, policies, and ideology.  
 
The Young Turk members took credit for the planning and implementation of the 
1908 Revolution, but most members remained relatively unknown within Ottoman 
society.  Following the 1908 revolution the CUP needed to gain legitimacy in the 
eyes of Ottoman citizens. Many of its members were young, unknown army officers 
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and low-ranking civilian offers, which added to the challenge of the movement 
gaining recognition and legitimacy.89    
 
In many ways the CUP was unprepared for the Ottoman landscape it encountered. 
During the years following the 1908 Revolution it carried out reforms in a haphazard 
manner and the movement lacked consensus on a coherent ideology, platform, or 
direction it should take. Before 1908 the CUP focused its efforts on the Revolution, 
not the aftermath. Its members gave comparatively little attention to the political 
problems that would need to be solved following the revolution.90  
 
The Young Turks were not the only members of Ottoman society that supported 
reinstating the constitution and removing the Empire’s leadership. 91  Other 
organizations emerged alongside the CUP, particularly during the years 1908-1911. 
Former opponents of the CUP led some of these groups while others emerged as 
reactionary groups with differing views. Among these groups were: the National 
Unionist Federation (Fedakâran-ı Millet Cemiyeti); the Ottoman Liberal Party 
(Osmanlı Ahrar Fırkası); the Ottoman Democratic Party (Osmanlı Demokrat Fırkası); 
the Mohammadin Union (İttihad-ı Muhammedi Fırkası); the Ottoman Committee of 
Alliance (Heyet-i Müttefika-i Osmaniye); the Moderate Liberal Party (Mutedil 
Hürriyetperveran Fırkası); the Ottoman Fundamental Reform Party (İslahat-ı 
Esasiye-i Osmaniye Fırkası); the People’s Party (Ahali Fırkası); the Ottoman 
Socialist Party (Osmanlı Sosyalist Fırkası); and the Association of Mohammedan 
Union (İttihad-ı Muhammedi Cemiyeti). 92  Many of the parties and groups that 
opposed the CUP united in 1911 to establish the Party of Freedom and Accord 
(Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası), also known as the Liberal Union or Liberal Entente. The 
party, whose members were unified by their common opposition to the CUP, 
remained politically active for only two years, during which time it was the main 
challenger to the CUP. 93   
Organization and Structure 
 
The CUP was not monolithic; it was a conglomerate of groups and factions with 
different backgrounds, loyalties and leaders.94 However, as Hanioğlu aptly points 
out,  
 
The term faction is insufficient to describe the component groups of the CUP, because they 
functioned almost as independent groups and some eventually adopted independent courses, 
even severing ties with the center.95 
 
Underneath the formal structure of the CUP there was a system of sub-groups 
informal networks. While the CUP’s Central Committee held the decision-making 
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power, these factions did not always agree with or follow the decisions of the inner 
circle.96 
 
Membership Base 
 
Members of the Young Turk movement were predominantly male, young, urban, and 
literate. The movement’s leadership and base membership consisted mostly of 
Muslims and ethnic Turks, but also included individuals with other ethnic (Arab, 
Albanian, Kurdish) and religious (some Jews, few Christians) backgrounds.97 Most 
members of the Young Turk movement came from Macedonia or Constantinople 
(Istanbul), while others had roots in the Empire’s Balkan provinces. 
 
Education and profession were the two defining characteristics of Young Turk 
membership. Members overwhelmingly received their education and training in one 
of the Empire’s new, Western-styled schools established by the Ottoman Sultans. 
The majority of the movement’s leadership knew a foreign language, often French. 
These French-language skills aided the Young Turk leadership in their studies of 
Western social and political thought put forth by European intellectuals, particularly 
Gustave Le Bon.98   
 
The Young Turks’ membership also consisted mostly of state employees or 
descendants of Ottoman state employees. Among them were teachers in the newly 
established schools, lawyers trained in Western law, junior military officers trained in 
the Empire’s Western-styled war colleges, journalists, doctors and civil servants. The 
CUP had a wide following in the Army and many of its members had military 
backgrounds.99  
 
CUP Central Committee  
 
The leadership of the Young Turk movement is well documented amongst the work 
of Turkish and Ottoman scholars. Both the civilian and military leadership that 
emerged in the post-Young Turk Revolution environment came predominantly (48%) 
from the Balkan region of the Empire with the next highest percentage coming from 
the capital city of Istanbul (26%).100 The background of the CUP’s leadership played 
an increasingly important role in the evolution of the movement’s ideology. Coming 
from the Balkan regions of the Empire, many of the movement’s leaders and key 
figures witnessed firsthand the expanding gap between Muslim and non-Muslim 
communities.  
 
After the Revolution the character of the Young Turk movement changed. Despite 
the fact that the military officers carried out the Revolution, it was the civilians of the 
CUP that dominated the Young Turk movement’s leadership. However, Talat Pasha 
and Enver Pasha, two of the military officers who carried out the 1908 Revolution, 
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played increasingly dominant roles in the CUP. As they rose to prominence within 
the movement, they pushed aside some of the movement’s founding members, such 
as Ahmed Rıza and Abdullah Cevdet, taking away any “real power” that remained 
with them.101 
 
Despite becoming a political party in 1909 the CUP remained a mostly secret 
organization whose actions were dictated by its Salonika-based Central Committee  
(Merkez-i Umumi). Throughout the movement’s existence its true power remained 
with the CUP’s Central Committee, which consisted of anywhere from three to twelve 
members and was headed by a General Secretary (Katib-i Umumi) who made the 
most important decisions. The members of this Central Committee were 
overwhelmingly from the Balkan region of the Empire. 102   
 
Since the Central Committee worked behind the scenes, a General Assembly that 
consisted of approximately twenty members enacted the organization’s policies. The 
CUP also set up a network of provincial centers run by party bosses, which they 
referred to in writings as ‘responsible secretaries’, ‘delegates’, and ‘inspectors’.103 
The leadership of the CUP was therefore a very small handful of individuals. The 
majority of members in the greater Young Turk movement were not involved in the 
CUP’s decision making and policy making or implementation. A divide existed not 
only among the members of the Central Committee, but also within the movement’s 
broader membership. These divisions highlight the need for current scholarship to 
point to specific factions or individuals within the movement when referencing its 
influence on the Kemalist movement.  
Young Turk Ideology 
 
“The mass basis of the Society [CUP] was amorphous and evolving; this was reflected in the 
shapelessness of its ideology.”104 
 
The ideological divisions within the Young Turk movement are most apparent in a 
comparison of the ideas of some its notable intellectuals. They include Ziya Gökalp, 
Abdullah Cevdet, Celal Nuri, and Yusuf Akçura. These individuals were among the 
Ottoman intellectuals who made the most profound contributions to late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century ideological discussions. A number of factors, some of 
which are detailed below, influenced these individuals’ beliefs and helped shaped the 
Ottoman intellectual scene during its final centuries.  
 
Outside Turks 
 
Throughout the nineteenth century there was a noticeable increase in domestic and 
cross-border communications between Turkish-speaking people. Familiarity with 
Turks from outside the Ottoman Empire expanded as Turkish-speaking immigrants, 
many from Russia, came to the Empire. Among the Young Turk movement’s earliest 
leaders, many individuals hailed from the Caucasus, Russian Empire or Russian 
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Transcaucasia provinces. Immigrants from these areas who became active in the 
Young Turk movement made important intellectual contributions and helped 
influence the movement’s ideology.105 This was particularly true regarding the CUP’s 
stance on pan-Turkism.  
 
Pan-Turkism (often used interchangeably with “Turanism” and “Turkism”) originated 
among the Tatar peoples in the early nineteenth century and first came to the 
Ottoman Empire via Russia emigrants. Supporters of pan-Turkism advocated for the 
cultural and political unification of all Turkic peoples and emphasized their common 
historical roots. Because pan-Turkism focused on the unification of Turkic peoples 
also living outside the Empire, some intellectuals believed it was an unrealistic 
strategy.106  
 
Yusuf Akçura, an ethnic Turk from Kazan, was an ardent supporter of pan-Turkism. 
Akçura campaigned strongly for pan-Turkism, calling for a unification of all Turkic 
people in Asia Minor, the Caucasus and Central Asia. 107 He reiterated this call in his 
famous 1904 article “Uç Tarzi-Siyaset” (“Three Ways of Policy”) and throughout his 
journal Türk Yurdu (Journal of the Turkish Homeland), which he founded in 1911.108 
Some leaders of the Young Turk movement dismissed Akçura’s writings, particularly 
his 1904 article, as extremist because he called for an identity based on race (ırk). At 
this time Ottomanism still remained popular with some members of the intelligentsia 
and promoting an identity based on race would have excluded non-Turkish elements 
of the population. 
 
Akçura’s ideas gained some traction within the movement, but mostly clashed with 
members of the CUP Central Committee and especially with Ziya Gökalp, who 
believed in an identity based on a shared culture instead of race. Even though 
Akçura and Gökalp disagreed on aspects of collective identity, Gökalp’s personal 
ideology was still very much influenced by Akçura and other ethnic Turks from 
Russia, such as Hüzeyinzade Ali and Ahmet Agaoğlu. Their support for pan-Turkish 
ideas helped shaped parts of Gökalp’s ideas on Turkish identity.  
 
The CUP had close ties to a number of Turkic associations that promoted pan-Turkic 
ideas throughout the Empire. These associations functioned as a way for 
intellectuals to put their ideas into action. Among the intellectuals who helped 
establish these organizations were Turkic immigrants from Eastern countries and 
proponents of pan-Turkism. Akçura, along with other CUP members, established 
one of the first associations called Türk Derneği (Association of Turks) in 1911. The 
establishment of Türk Yurdu (Turkish Hearth) followed shortly after. By 1914 Türk 
Ocağı had sixteen hearths and more than 3,000 members. By 1920, its membership 
totaled over 30,000.109 Alongside these association emerged a number of journals 
(many of the same name), such as Türk Derneği, Türk Yurdu, and Genç Kalemlar.110 
Turkish-speaking emigrants from Russia, such as Yusuf Akçura and Hüzeyinzade 
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Ali, set up many of these journals and some of the main contributors were of Central 
Asian origin. In the journals, Akçura, Gökalp, and other Ottoman intellectuals 
promoted pan-Turkism and the collective awareness of the Turkish people.   
 
These associations and journals were spaces where proponents of mainly pan-
Turkish ideas met for discussions and shared their thoughts. The work of these 
associations focused on encouraging the Turkish people to take pride in their culture, 
heritage, history and language. By the mid 1910’s pan-Turkism came to be one of 
the most dominant ideologies amongst Ottoman intellectuals. For many intellectuals 
though, pan-Turkism complimented, not rivaled, Ottomanism. Pan-Turkish ideas 
were confined within the overarching identity of Ottomanism and the desire to rescue 
the Empire from collapse. However, a distinct shift towards a pan-Turkish identity 
and away from a unified Ottoman identity picked up speed after the Balkan Wars as 
the Empire’s population dramatically shifted in favor of the Turks.111 
 
Japan as a Model 
 
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries many Young Turks paid close 
attention to the unfolding events in Japan and Russia. This reinforced their criticism 
of European imperialism and aspirations for the Empire to catch up to Europe. 
Particularly in the years leading up to the 1908 Revolution, Young Turk publications 
often referenced developments in Japan, the tactics used by the Japanese to carry 
out the Meiji Restoration, and how these tactics could be applied to the Ottoman 
Empire’s own struggle.112 Abdullah Cevdet once referred to Japan’s ability to rival 
Europe by saying: “The West slapped Japan only once; it awakened. We have been 
slapped a thousand times; if we are still not awake, is it the West’s fault?”113 
 
In the eyes of Cevdet and other Young Turk members, Japan was a model of how 
the Ottoman Empire could not only survive, but also become a modern nation 
respected by Europe. Both Japan and the Ottoman Empire “sought to westernize 
despite Western imperialism at the same time as they both saw themselves as once 
part of Asia but no longer of Asia.” 114  The Young Turks’ admiration for Japan 
increased in 1902 when Japan signed an alliance with the British, symbolizing to the 
Young Turks that the Asian country was considered an equal power. Japan became 
the Young Turks’ non-Western model of modernization. Beginning in 1908 some 
members of the Young Turk movement, including Ahmed Rıza and Nazim Bey, 
started using the term “Japan of the Near East” when describing the Empire.  This 
term referenced their desire for the Empire to become an “independent, militarily 
strong, and economically viable Ottoman polity governed by an elite determined to 
realize their Unionist ideology.”115  
 
‘The West’, Westernization and Western Influences  
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Frequently referred to by European powers as the “Sick Man of Europe,” the 
Ottoman Empire struggled for respect and recognition.116 The Empire continued to 
face financial decline and territorial losses, which contributed to European beliefs 
that it was incapable of handling its own domestic affairs and increasingly 
susceptible to outside influences. European encroachment was not unfamiliar to the 
Ottomans. Since Europeans had traded in the Middle East since the Middle Ages, 
there was no “dramatic entrance or accompanying culture shock,” instead there was 
a gradual increase in European influences that shifted the Ottoman-European 
relationship. 117  This progressive European encroachment prompted a shift in 
Ottoman politics. Instead of focusing on managing inter-relations and ensuring the 
loyalty of the Empire’s subjects, the state increasingly focused on “civilizing subjects 
on the world stage of modernity.”118 
 
Makdisi says Ottoman orientalism was a defining characteristic of nineteenth century 
Ottoman history. He argues that Ottoman orientalism was not an unintended 
consequence of Western influences but instead a defining trait of Ottoman 
modernity. In his writings, he defines ‘Ottoman orientalism’ as,  
 
“..a complex of Ottoman attitudes produced by a nineteenth century age of Ottoman reform 
that implicitly and explicitly acknowledged the West to be the home of progress and the East, 
writ large, to be a present theater of backwardness.”119  
 
Ottomans recognized and responded to the influence of Western powers through a 
mix of embrace and resistance. Ottoman modernization was both a quest for power 
and an expression of resistance against Western imperialism.120 Ottoman reform 
was part engagement with European influences and part reaction to perceived 
European superiority.121  
 
The Young Turks saw an Ottoman Empire that became increasingly penetrated by 
and dependent on European powers as Western countries increased their economic 
and political influence in the Ottoman Empire. Capitulations had given foreign 
residents in the Ottoman Empire exemption from Ottoman taxes, reduced customs 
duties, and other privileges.122 The capitulatory system allowed those receiving these 
rights to fall under the protection of the countries that granted them, thereby creating 
a protégé system that undermined Ottoman rule. To many Ottoman intellectuals the 
European capitulations symbolized Ottoman inferiority to Europe and signaled a 
broader decline in the Empire’s power and influence.123 They also believed that the 
capitulations were a violation of Ottoman sovereignty and a barrier to the Empire’s 
progress. 
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A belief that the Ottoman Empire was falling behind and struggling for survival 
directly influenced the evolution of Young Turk ideology during the late nineteenth 
century. Some Ottoman reformers felt compelled to counter ‘European 
misrepresentations’ of the Islamic East.124  Ottoman elites also took note of Western 
military and technological advances, leading them to compare the Empire to 
European countries. Europe became the standard for measuring the progress of 
Westernizing reforms. Writings in Young Turk publications, such as Tanin, promoted 
the idea that once Westernization reforms were in place, the West would respect the 
Empire as an equal power, stop interfering in the Empire’s domestic affairs, and 
cease capitulations.125 
 
Intellectual borrowing from Europe contributed to the emergence of ideas and 
discussions of a reimagined Ottoman society. A mental transformation took place as 
Ottoman intellectuals faced increasing exposure to western life, culture, and thinking 
while living in Europe. Westernization became synonymous with modernization and 
advancement, and many believed it was the only path to overcoming European 
imperialism and countering the Empire’s domestic threats. Members of the Young 
Turk movement also believed interactions with the West had a significant impact on 
Ottoman thought. One Young Turk leader, Sabahaddin Bey, commented on this 
impact by saying, “Since we established relations with western civilization, an 
intellectual renaissance has occurred; prior to this relationship our society lacked any 
intellectual life.”126 
 
While the Young Turks held Western intellectual thought in high regard, they 
criticized the interventionist policies of the West. Eliminating Western economic 
penetration and political intervention in the Empire became a driving force behind the 
development of Young Turk ideology. As areas of the Empire, primarily the Balkans, 
saw more European intervention in economic affairs, it was the Christians and 
foreigners under European protections that became the main beneficiaries. By the 
end of the nineteenth century the wealth, education, and prosperity gap between 
them and the Muslims had grown considerably larger. 127 The members of the Young 
Turk movement in the Balkans were increasingly conscious of this divide. The 
advancements of the Christian and foreign residents of the Empire also provided the 
Young Turks with examples of modernity to which the Young Turks aspired to 
achieve. This influenced the Young Turks’ ideas of modernity and their interpretation 
of modernity as being synonymous with European ways of life.  
 
The image of Europe and Western societies had a strong and varied impact on 
Ottoman thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Many Young 
Turks received their education in Western-style institutions and lived in European 
countries for at least a short period of time. They valued Western civilization while 
still opposing Western imperialism; to them the West was both a model and a threat 
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to the Empire’s existence. Ottoman intellectuals’ perceptions of the West—its power, 
culture, and developments—shaped their ideas on how to reform the Empire.  
 
Civilization 
 
For Ottoman intellectuals the concepts of ‘modernity’, ‘civilization’ and 
‘Westernization’ were intertwined. This was increasingly apparent in the nineteenth 
century when discussions on Westernizing reforms were on the rise. While the term 
‘modernization’ once referred to the goal of overthrowing the Sultan and reinstating 
the constitution, its definition later shifted to indicate the implementation of 
Westernizing reforms. Modernity became an overarching goal, which was to be 
achieved through the adoption of one, or a mix, of the three prevailing ideologies of 
the time: Ottomanism, pan-Islamism or pan-Turkism.128  
 
The concept of ‘civilization’ also witnessed considerable transformation beginning in 
the eighteenth century. Ottoman intellectuals in the nineteenth century began to use 
the term medeniyet to reference the emerging concept of civilization. This term was 
influenced by ideas of enlightenment, known as akilcilik (rationalism), and 
symbolized the compatibility of science and technology with faith. Nineteenth century 
Ottoman intellectuals used medeniyet to signify refinement, grace, order, respect for 
set rules, and a higher form of living.129 
 
As Ottoman thought continued to evolve and the concept of civilization gained 
popularity among Ottoman elites the concept fused with muasirlasmak (“to reach the 
level of contemporary civilization”). By the end of the nineteenth century all Ottoman 
elites, regardless of their affiliation as “modernists,” “Islamists,” or “nationalists,” were 
in agreement that the Empire must attain the status of being a civilized society. 
However, there was no consensus on the degree of civilization the Empire should 
adopt.130  
 
Two of the most notable Young Turk members, Cevdet and Gökalp, had different 
views on the Empire’s adoption of Western civilization. Early on, Cevdet’s ideas had 
a direct influence on Gökalp’s ideological development. Contact between the two 
began during Gökalp’s childhood and continued through the foundation of the 
Turkish Republic. Cevdet first introduced Gökalp to French thought, particularly 
sociology and the works of Durkheim, and urged him to join the CUP in its early 
years. Gökalp went on to join the Central Committee and write many of the CUP’s 
circulars and memoranda in the decade following the 1908 Revolution.131  
 
While Cevdet and Gökalp had some overlap in their ideas, their beliefs diverged 
regarding their stances on the adoption of Western civilization. Gökalp, like other 
Central Committee members, cast Cevdet off as ‘radical’ since he promoted the 
complete adoption of Western civilization and the exclusion of religion. Cevdet 
argued for the complete and total adoption of Western civilization: “There is only one 
civilization, and that is European civilization. Therefore, we must borrow western 
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civilization with both its roses and thorns.”132 Gökalp instead hoped for a nation that 
would “join the civilization of Europe while preserving its own national identity and 
culture,” though in his opinion these were separate from civilization.  
 
In his writings Gökalp referenced the similarities between religion and civilization, 
saying that Ottoman civilization would emerge from “Eastern spirituality and Western 
materialism.”133  
 
Those who accept a civilization with all of its principles cannot take only portions of it. And, 
even if they take it, they cannot digest it. Civilization, just like religion, should not be taken 
superficially, but internally. Civilization is just like religion. First, it should be believed in and 
one should be sincerely loyal to it. 134 
 
By likening civilization to religion, Gökalp emphasized that one could not hold 
allegiance to both, thereby underscoring the separation of religion in the adoption of 
Western civilization. Gökalp was not always consistent in this belief though. At times 
he mentioned the religious foundations of civilization, alluding to the idea that the two 
were intertwined: “A civilization first begins as a religious community.”135  
 
Intellectual Influencers  
 
The ideology of the Young Turk movement reflected many of the traditions of the 
French Revolution. Many of the movement’s early leaders and members spent time 
in Europe, either living in exile or studying, and many of those individuals lived in 
France. This was especially true in the years leading up to the 1908 Revolution. The 
first faction of the Young Turk movement originated in Europe and spread to many 
larger cities, particularly Paris. During this time the scholarly works of French 
intellectuals heavily impacted the development of many Young Turk members’ 
beliefs. Auguste Comte and Gustave Le Bon were amongst the most influential 
intellectuals.  
 
Members of the Young Turk movement not only read Le Bon’s works, but also 
translated by them into Ottoman Turkish. They regularly cited Le Bon’s ideas on 
elitism in Young Turk publications and also in their individual writings. Le Bon’s ideas 
penetrated all strands of thought on the Young Turk movement’s ideological 
spectrum and were some of the most widely referenced by Young Turk members. 
Inspired by Le Bon’s work, the CUP also dedicated part of their efforts to the creation 
of an intellectual elite that could guide the masses. 
 
The Young Turks familiarized themselves with popular materialist theories of the 
mid-nineteenth century that focused on race. Despite broad support for Le Bon’s 
ideas on elitism and populism, the Young Turk movement did not underscore the 
importance of race in their formulation of nationalist ideas. The Young Turks’ 
ideology refrained from creating nationalist aims based on race during the 
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movement’s formative, early years. Race was an important part of discussions, but 
not of those regarding nationalism, at least not until after the Balkan Wars.  
 
Because of the Turks’ placement in the Darwinist racial hierarchy, and because of 
the participation of many non-Turks in the Young Turk movement, the CUP 
leadership opted against pursuing a race-based nationalist ideology in its early 
years. According to Darwin’s theory, the Turks and Asians were placed at the bottom 
of this hierarchy. However, Japanese modernization prompted the Young Turks to 
reinterpret their placement in the racial hierarchy. The example of the Japanese 
indicated to the Young Turks that their location the hierarchy was inaccurate and that 
they could also compete with Western superiority. 136   This altered perception 
expanded discussions about the intersection of race and identity within the Young 
Turk movement.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Between the Young Turk movement’s ascendance to power and the downfall of the 
CUP leadership during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire numerous factors 
influenced the movement’s ideology. Throughout this period the Young Turk 
leadership pursued a combination of Ottomanism, pan-Islamism, and pan-Turkism, 
depending on the circumstances. No concrete platform for the movement’s ideology 
appeared during this time. Instead, the Central Committee attempted to strategically 
use multiple concepts to arouse support and obedience from the Ottoman 
population. Members outside the movement’s leadership circle, however, did not 
always support these concepts. The forthcoming chapters will describe the 
divergence within the Young Turk movement’s ideology and this ideology’s link to the 
Kemalists movement. 
Chapter 3: Kemalists 
 
After the Ottoman Empire’s defeat in World War I, leaders of the Central Committee 
credited with Ottoman entry into the war and the Armenian genocide left the Empire 
and went into exile. Among them were Enver Pasha, Talat Pasha and Dr. Nazim. 
This leadership vacuum led, in part, to the accelerated rise of a Turkish nationalist 
movement that was already in the making.137 It was after the exile of CUP leadership 
that Mustafa Kemal came to play a leading role in the Turkish nationalist movement. 
Kemal’s efforts to strengthen the Turkish nationalist movement were supported by 
military officers, activists, and lower-ranking leaders, many of whom had CUP 
backgrounds. Among them were Fuat Cebesoy, Kazim Karabekir and Ismet Inounu. 
 
The Congresses of Erzurum and Sivas, both held in 1919, were some of the first 
decisive steps by the Turkish nationalist movement to advance the goal of creating a 
distinctly Turkish nation-state. In Erzurum the members of the Congress named 
Mustafa Kemal, a junior military officer and member of the Young Turk movement, 
the leader of the national resistance movement. During the Congress in Sivas, 
Kemal called on those present to unify around the goal of creating a Turkish 
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homeland.138 He also required all attending members to take an oath renouncing the 
CUP and its policies. This was one of the first major points of departure between 
Kemal and the CUP leadership. From here on out Kemal took every opportunity to 
set himself apart from the exiled CUP leadership and their failures.  
 
The Congress in Sivas led to the formation of the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli), which 
the Ottoman parliament went on to adopt in 1920. Among other things, the National 
Pact outlined the need for a National Assembly that would safeguard the interests of 
the nation, which did not technically exist yet. After the conclusion of the Congress in 
Sivas, Kemal and other members of the movement, including Ali Fuat Ceseboy and 
Rauf Orbay, authored the Amasya Circular, the first document setting the national 
resistance movement’s plan into motion.139  
 
The Greco-Turkish War, referenced in Turkish historiography as the Turkish War of 
Resistance or the Turkish War of Independence, was a military resistance led by the 
Turkish nationalist movement against the ethnic Greek inhabitants of Anatolia. 
Kemal and the members of the Turkish nationalist movement portrayed the war as 
necessary to protect Anatolia, the Turks self-proclaimed homeland. In doing so they 
emphasized the importance of Anatolia as a homeland for the Turks and 
underscored that the Turks should rise to its defense.140 Kemal also used Islam to 
help mobilize the Muslim population to join the war efforts and as a way to create a 
sense of unity among those fighting in the war.141  
 
The war lasted from 1919-1922 and ended with the Turkish national movement’s 
victory. As a result, Greece released the territory of Eastern Thrace and Western 
Anatolia, the two sides agreed to a forced population exchange, and the Treaty of 
Lausanne recognized the national sovereignty of the Republic of Turkey. Kemal 
became a self-declared hero and the first President of the newly established 
Republic. In the first decades of the Republic’s existence, Kemal and his supporters, 
known as the Kemalists, enacted a series of sweeping reforms aimed to put the 
Republic on the path to modernity. Under Kemal’s authoritarian leadership the 
nationalist movement successfully held on to their newfound power, despite multiple 
attempts by former CUP Unionists to retake control.142 In doing so Kemal created a 
monopoly of power for himself and the members of the Kemalist movement. 
Rise of Kemalist Movement 
 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
 
Mustafa Kemal’s place in and relationship with the CUP is commonly portrayed in 
one of two ways. In his famous 1927 speech, the Nutuk, Kemal described himself as 
a member of the CUP whose talents were overlooked by its central leadership. 
According to this account, Kemal would later, by his own ambitions, rise to overtake 
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Enver and lead the Turkish national resistance that culminated in victory with the 
Turkish War of Independence. Turkish historiography largely adopts this view.  
 
Outside of Turkish historiography, however, scholars have more carefully analyzed 
Kemal’s relationship with the CUP. Though parts of the above storyline are accurate, 
Kemal largely exaggerated or downplayed many aspects of his relationship with the 
CUP to further legitimize his leadership role in the nationalist movement and his 
separation from the then disgraced CUP leaders. Throughout his ascendance to 
power he continued to seek out opportunities to discredit those previously involved 
with the CUP and the Young Turk movement. In the Nutuk, and also in his memoirs, 
Kemal criticized the old CUP leaders and referred to them as doubters, incompetents 
and traitors. All the while Kemal described himself as the original leader of the 
Turkish nationalist movement. In his timeline, he disregarded the early years of the 
Young Turk movement and reframes the national resistance movement as a struggle 
to establish a Turkish state instead of one to save the failing Empire.143   
 
Kemal’s involvement with Ottoman opposition groups began in 1905 when he played 
a role in establishing the Fatherland and Freedom society in Damascus and 
Salonika. He did not join the CUP until 1908, at which point the organization was well 
established and had defined leadership. During World War I Kemal held various 
roles of importance, most notably as the commander of the Dardanelles campaign in 
1915.144 He was known within the army, mostly for being a ‘trouble maker’ for his 
constant criticism of the CUP’s military decisions and his breaches of discipline. 
Multiple sources, including Kemal himself, claim that Kemal advocated for the 
complete separation of the army from politics and that this led to a tense relationship 
with many members of the CUP who did not agree with this stance. However, there 
is little evidence supporting this claim.145  
 
Though at one time Kemal regretted his lack of authority within the CUP, the 
distance between himself and the Central Committee later worked to his advantage 
as Enver Pasha and the other leaders became tied to the Empire’s military defeats 
and the Armenian genocide. Kemal pointed to his ‘clean slate’ to help legitimize his 
role as commander of the nationalist movement during the Greco-Turkish war. When 
he took this role the greater Ottoman public did not know him.146  
 
Building on the success of the war, Kemal later emerged as the unrivaled leader of 
the newly declared Republic of Turkey. Both he and his supporters pushed a 
narrative that credited Kemal with the existence of the Republic and contributed to 
the emergence of a personality cult around him. The Turkish state portrayed Kemal 
as the father of the nation and Kemal even adopted the surname Atatürk (“father of 
the Turks”) in 1934. The idea that he pulled the Republic from the ashes of the 
Empire played a large role in the widespread idolization of him. Turkish schools 
taught students not only about Kemalist reforms but also about Kemal’s personal life 
and accomplishments. The state erected statues of Kemal in Turkish towns and 
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inscribed quotes on buildings and structures throughout the country, many of which 
are still in existence today.  
 
Baskan says that the image of a new Turkey and its civilized leader was 
“wholeheartedly accepted abroad.” Kemal portrayed himself as an icon of Western 
culture and civilization: a well-dressed, well-mannered, well-educated, multi-lingual 
individual. 147  He presented himself as the sole creator, and often the sole 
implementer, of Kemalist ideology. By pushing this image to the public, Kemal and 
his supporters further contributed to the formation of a personality cult around 
‘Atatürk’.148 Dogan attributes the formation of the Atatürk personality cult to Kemal’s 
ability to establish a direct relationship between the leader and the masses, his 
personification as a bearer of collective hope, and his symbol as the future of the 
nation.149 Kemal’s image as ‘Atatürk’ helped personify his political power and solidify 
his authority as leader of the Turkish Republic. Kemal leveraged his position of 
power to cement his role in the creation of the Republic in the minds of the people.  
 
Kemal became a leader with the ability to exercise dictatorial powers. Until his death 
he remained at the forefront of the Republic’s leadership, which consisted of 
approximately ten other individuals. Throughout his time as president, having a close 
personal relationship with him became one of the most important instruments of 
power. Unlike the Young Turk movement, which scholars do not attribute to one 
individual, this Kemalist movement is in many ways directly tied to Kemal. While 
Kemal did not single-handedly implement the radical reforms of the 1920s and 1930s 
in Turkey, he is portrayed throughout Turkish historiography and academic works as 
the sole figurehead of the movement.150   
 
Kemalists 
 
Despite his role as leader of the state and his ability to dictate decisions to his party, 
Kemal did not run the day-to-day operations of the Republic. One of Kemal’s closest 
associates, Ismet Inonu, headed seven of the thirteen cabinets and ensured the 
implementation of Kemal’s policy decisions.  
 
Similar to the breakdown of the Young Turks, the Kemalists were mostly young, 
Muslim males from urban areas. A large majority of them spoke more than one 
language, received a Western-style education, and previously served in the Ottoman 
military. The biggest shared traits among them were that none received a religious 
education at a medrese and none had come from a peasant or working class 
background.151  
 
Amongst the fifty most powerful individuals, one-third had Balkan origins and eighty 
four percent came from the most developed areas of the former Ottoman Empire. 
Additionally, more than half of the leaders of ruling Republican People’s Party (RPP) 
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came from the areas of the former Ottoman Empire that were lost in 1911-1913. 152 
This had a profound impact on the development of Kemalist nationalist ideology 
during the early years of the Republic.  
 
Kemalist Opposition 
 
Early divisions of the Turkish nationalist movement appeared with the establishment 
of the Grand National Assembly (GNA) in Ankara in 1920. Its members held different 
views on the functions and leadership of the GNA. Halide Edib, a member of the 
nationalist movement, described this divergence as a split between upholders of the 
“Eastern ideal” and those of the “Western ideal.”153 During the proceedings of the 
GNA another nationalist described it as “a point where two great floods are 
meeting.”154 Some believed the GNA should be an institution that lasted only for the 
duration of the national movement, while others believed it should follow the path of 
the Ottoman parliament or become a permanent institution.  
 
Kemal’s leadership did not go unchallenged. He had the support of only 197 of the 
215 members of the first Turkish Parliament. While the members of the GNA united 
around the goal of securing Turkish independence and territorial integrity, following 
the Turkish victory in the war its membership split into two factions: the First Group, 
which consisted of Kemal and his supporters, and the Second Group, made up of 
Kemal’s opponents and many former CUP members. 155 The First Group established 
the Republic People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası [RPP]) in 1924, which went on 
to dominate the second parliament and elect Kemal as the first president of the 
Republic. The RPP was the only legal political party in Turkey until 1946.156 The 
party began as a conglomerate of local and regional resistance groups. Prior to the 
Greco-Turkish War, Kemal sought to unite these groups around the common goal of 
establishing a homeland for the Turkish people of Anatolia. These groups formed the 
basis of the RPP. The majority of the RPP’s leadership consisted of committed 
Turkish nationalists who became involved in the resistance movement early on. In its 
early years the RPP operated as an extension to the state and later became its main 
tool for indoctrination and mobilization.157  
 
The Second Group represented a very real threat to Kemal and his circle of 
supporters. The two groups differed the most on the abolishment of the Sultanate 
and Caliphate, an issue that fueled the power struggle between them. In 1924 the 
members of the Second Group formed the Progressive Republican Party 
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(Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası [TCF]), but its existence was short-lived. In 1925 
the Kemalists banned the party and the government returned to a one-party system. 
The Kemalists’ decision to ban the party fell in line with their broader goal of 
eliminating opposition from former members of the Young Turk movement, which 
they sough to disconnect themselves from. The involvement of Rauf Orbay, Kazim 
Karabekir, and Ali Fuat Cesboy in the TCF represented a clear, direct link to the 
Young Turk movement, which the Kemalists sought to eradicate.158  
 
Kemalists used a one party system to create an environment that was conducive to 
Kemal and his immediate circle governing all aspects of the state. To preserve this 
environment the Kemalists proceeded to liquidate all existing opposition, beginning 
but not ending with the former members of the CUP. The Kemalists sought out and 
eliminated these individuals, both literally and figuratively, in the first decade of the 
Republic.159 The Angora Trials exemplified Kemalist efforts to discredit and eliminate 
any opposition to their authority.  
 
In 1926, a plot to murder Kemal was uncovered in the Turkish city of Izmir after one 
of the plotters came forward to the authorities.160 An investigation was conducted 
after which the court accused twenty-nine members of the former CUP of plotting the 
murder of Kemal and organizing a coup d'état against the Kemalist regime. Through 
a subsequent investigation, the state sought to uncover the post-war activities of the 
accused CUP members. 161  In the end the state concluded that a number of 
members from the Unionist Party and other opposition groups conspired to form an 
organization that would, at the opportune moment, attempt to replace the Kemalist 
regime.162 At the end of the trial the court charged the accused with premeditated 
murder and planning a coup d'état.163 
 
Kemalism 
 
Kemalism, also known as Atatürkism, was the all-encompassing ideology of Kemal 
and his supporters. The Kemalists sought to bring about a civilizational shift in which 
a secular, Turkish nation would replace the religious community inherited from the 
Ottoman Empire.164 Kemalism evolved over the first decades of the Turkish Republic 
but always centered on six intertwined components, also known as the Six Arrows: 
republicanism, populism, secularism, nationalism, revolutionism, and étatism/statism. 
In 1937 the Turkish parliament officially incorporated these Six Arrows into the 
Turkish constitution.165  These core principles guided Kemalists in their efforts to 
transform state, education, law, religion, and social life in the early Turkish Republic. 
Kemalists believed these concepts represented the keys to modernity. All six 
Kemalist arrows had indisputable roots in the Ottoman era and in many cases 
amongst the Westernists, also known as the garbcılar, of the Young Turk movement.  
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At the time of the Turkish Republic’s establishment, the question of ‘who was a Turk’ 
had yet to be answered. In the years that followed, the foundation of the Republic the 
Kemalist regime did not offer a clear definition of Turkish nationality. In neither the 
Nutuk in 1927 nor in his speech on the tenth anniversary of the Republic in 1933, 
Kemal’s two biggest speeches, did Kemal offer up a solid definition of Turkish 
national identity. Kemalist era Turkish nationalism was characterized by a conceptual 
overlap of race, ethnicity, and nation. However, Turkishness continued to be defined 
independently of race and ethnicity until as late as the 1920s.166 
 
Turkish nationalism did not gain immediate and universal acceptance after the 
foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Differing views on which direction the 
new Republic should take still existed and after 1923 debates continued to take 
place on which ideological path to pursue.167 These differences led to a flexible 
understanding of Turkish national identity in the Kemalist Era. The 1930 RPP 
program described the Turkish nation as a “social and political formation comprising 
citizens linked together by the community of language, culture and ideal.” 168  
Elaborating on the Kemalists’ concept of a ‘nation,’ the then RPP party secretary 
said:  
 
We consider as ours all those of our citizens who live among us, who belong politically and 
socially to the Turkish nation and among whom ideas and feelings such as “Kurdism,” 
“Circassianism” and even “Lazism” and “Pomakism” have been implanted. We deem it our 
duty to banish, by sincere efforts, those false conceptions, which are the legacy of an 
absolutist regime and the product of long-standing historical oppression. The scientific truth of 
today does not allow an independent existence for a nation of several hundred thousand, or 
even of a million individuals…. We want to state just as sincerely our opinion regarding our 
Jewish and Christian compatriots. Our party considers these compatriots as absolutely 
Turkish insofar as they belong to our community of language and ideal.169 
 
Kemalist nationalism was therefore strategically all encompassing in its broad 
definition of who qualified as Turkish citizens. This allowed the Kemalists to 
continuously mold Turkish nationalism to meet their needs and the present 
conditions. Going into 1930s there was a gradual shift towards reframing 
Turkishness in terms of ethnicity and race, yet the Kemalists never stopped 
attempting to force inhabitants into accepting a Turkish identity through the adoption 
of culture and language.  
 
Sculpting Turkish National Identity 
 
Kemal was extremely cautious in the early phase of the Turkish nationalist struggle 
when describing the national basis of the movement.170 In the 1930s, the Kemalists 
reframed Turkishness by claiming all of Turkey’s past and present inhabitants were 
ethnically and racially Turkish. However, in reality this was not the case, as there 
were many minorities and non-Turks that resided within the borders of the Empire.   
 
166 Cagaptay, “Race, Assimilation and Kemalism: Turkish Nationalism and the Minorities in the 
1930s.” p. 86. 
167 Tachau, “The Search for National Identity Among the Turks.” p. 166. 
168 Tunaya, Turkiye’de Siyasi Partiler. p. 585. 
169 Recep Parker, quoted in Dumont, “The Origins of Kemalist Ideology.” p. 29. 
170 Karpat, Ottoman Past and Today’s Turkey. p. 167. 
 37 
In an attempt to shift this reality, the Kemalists forcefully pushed Turkish identity onto 
the Republic’s population.  
 
The Kemalists did this despite failing to settle on concrete definition of or 
requirements for Turkish identity. This included the Kemalists’ use of terms such as 
‘Turk’ and ‘Turkish’. While the Kemalists gradually stopped using the terms ‘Ottoman’ 
and ‘Muslim’, replacing them with ‘Turk’ and ‘Turkish’, there was no clear indication 
of what these terms actually meant. 171  Heper notes that Kemal used the term 
‘Turkish’ as a name, and not as an adjective. He also used ‘Turkish’ as an umbrella 
term that referred to people of different religious and ethnic identities. Thus, the term 
had more than one connotation and did not only denote one’s ethnicity.172  The 
Kemalists never provided clear meanings of ‘Turk’ and ‘Turkish’, but they did 
differentiate between the two terms in their perceptions of the Republics inhabitants. 
In the minds of the Kemalists, one could be born a ‘Turk’, but one must earn the right 
of being ‘Turkish’. Being ‘Turkish’ depended on an individual’s acceptance and 
acquisition of a set of secular, nationalistic beliefs and rituals.  
 
While the Kemalists put forth a legal framework for Turkish citizenship that included 
all the Republic’s subjects, they also made distinctions between ‘citizenship’ and 
‘belonging’.173 Thus, non-Turks and non-Muslims could in become Turkish citizens, 
but not fully Turkish. Turkishness thus became a category that included some, but 
not all, Turkish citizens. 174  The legal framework for Turkish citizenship did not 
exclude any communities in the Republic’s borders, however in practice this was not 
the case. The state viewed some communities as unwilling to adopt Turkishness and 
excluded them in their perceptions of ‘belonging’. Turkishness was therefore a 
process that depended on the willingness of the state and the individual. This further 
complicated efforts to define the requirements of ‘Turkishness’.175 A discussion in the 
Turkish Parliament on the population exchange project during the early years of the 
Republic highlighted one Turkish official’s concerns regarding this challenge: 
 
When we want to send the Greeks and Armenians, what will be our answer if they say, 
‘These people are Turkish according to the law accepted by your parliament…they cannot be 
Turks’. The parliament cannon make these fugitive Greeks and Armenians Turks. They do 
not want to be Turks, no way.176 
 
An Environment for Reform 
 
When analyzing how and why the Kemalists were able to implement such radical 
reforms in the early years of the Turkish Republic one must understand the unique 
circumstances of this time period. First and foremost, the demographic changes that 
took place beginning in 1912 were momentous. The loss of the predominately 
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Christian Balkans, coupled with Muslim immigration from the Balkans and 
resettlement in other parts of the Empire, led to an environment the Kemalist felt was 
optimal for rapid reforms. In the early years of the Republic Kemalists gave the most 
attention to reforming the overt and visible aspects of Ottoman and Islamic culture, 
such as language, appearance, and institutions.177   
 
Kemalist reforms are defined throughout current scholarship as ‘radical’. Dumont 
explains that, “the rhythm of innovations was so rapid and so noticeable from the 
outside, observers in Turkey and abroad came to believe that the Kemalist 
Revolution was by its very nature profoundly different from all past processes of 
change in Turkish society.”178 Kemal himself also underscored the pace at which this 
transformation took place, referring to the changes as “grandiose movements, more 
sublime and intense than what is commonly meant by the word revolution.”179 
 
Migration was one of the most powerful factors influencing Ottoman identity 
transformation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although 
migration was not new to the Ottoman Empire, the last years of its existence were 
arguably some of most turbulent regarding population shifts. Ottomans constantly 
moved throughout the Empire and persons from outside the Empire resettled inside 
its fluctuating borders. These population shifts led to noticeable changes in the areas 
of the Empire that saw some of the largest influxes of migrants, such as Anatolia. 
Years of successive wars, migration and internal violence allowed the Kemalists to 
inherit extremely weakened social and religious institutions. Between 1919 and 1927 
the population of Anatolia dropped from 15.3 million to 13.6 million. Out of the 
population of 13.6 million, a mere 2.6 percent were non-Muslims. 180  This shift 
towards religious homogenization provided the Kemalists with an entirely different 
population than the one presented to the Young Turks leadership.  
 
The Kemalists saw this new demographic environment as an opportunity to enact a 
radical nation-building project. Through a series of rapid, ruthless reforms based on 
the Six Arrows, the Kemalists sought to transform individuals living within the borders 
of the Republic into their ideal version of loyal Turkish citizens. The state 
incorporated cultural, linguistic, and religious elements into the policies it set forth. 
Refusal to adopt any or all aspects of Turkish identity was not tolerated, and the 
state did not hesitate to crack down on non-ethnic Turkish and non-Muslim groups. 
As one British diplomat observed in 1934: “hundreds of persons were arrested for 
speaking languages other than Turkish,” especially in Mersin where there were large 
populations of non-Turkish speakers.181 
 
Kemalists sought to completely transform society by creating a cognitive revolution in 
the Republic.182 Each reform put forth by the Kemalists was an attempt to sever ties 
with the Republic’s Ottoman past, to which the Kemalists claimed no links. For 
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example, the official day of rest moved from Sunday to Friday, just as in European 
societies, and official titles like ‘Pasha’, ‘Bey’ and ‘Efendi’ no longer permitted.183 The 
state also introduced and required the use of the European clock, calendar, 
measurement and weight systems, and numerals. 184   An overarching desire to 
disconnect from the former Empire was evident in all aspects of Kemalism and also 
frequently stated by the Kemalists: “The new Turkey bears no relation to the old 
Turkey. The old Ottoman government has passed into history now a new Turkey has 
been born.”185  
 
Educational authoritarianism enabled Kemalist leaders to further eliminate links to 
the Republic’s Ottoman past and separate religion from the public sphere.186 The 
Kemalists’ belief in education and their depicted roles as teachers of a ‘backwards 
population’ were central elements of the new Republic’s guiding ideology. For the 
Kemalists, education also went hand in hand with the creation and enforcement of a 
shared Turkish identity. Primary education became mandatory for all children, 
meaning there was less time for them to attend religious lessons elsewhere. 
Kemalists only allowed those seen as ‘dependable’ followers to remain in teaching 
positions and promptly dismissed others. This tight control of the state’s education 
allowed the Kemalists to seamlessly weave their principles into students’ curricula 
throughout their academic careers. 187 
 
The construction of a new education system allowed the state to incorporate its 
secular goals through school curricula. To the Kemalists, secularism was not only 
the separation of the Turkish state from Islam, but also the separation of Islam from 
individuals’ thought and reasoning.188 Religion was therefore not a core component 
of Turkishness for the Kemalists. This rejection of religion as part of Turkish identity 
directly contrasted with the ideas of Turkishness put forth by Gökalp. Gökalp’s 
version of Turkishness underscored the importance of religion as a key element of 
Turkish identity. 189 In Gökalp’s mind, religion could act as glue that could help bind 
society together under a common identity. 
 
To expand the distance between religion and reasoning the state implemented a 
number of reforms that reinforced the separation between religious symbols and 
daily life. Under the 1924 Law on Unification of Education the Kemalists eliminated 
religious lessons at public schools and either abolished religious schools or placed 
them under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. The law also banned the 
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teaching of languages other than Turkish. By eliminating the education of other 
languages the government also limited expressions of non-Turkish identities. 190   
 
The Kemalists’ use of language reforms aided their efforts to mold the population 
into loyal Turks, but the Kemalists faced significant resistance to these reforms. 
Many ethnic and religious groups in the new Republic resisted the state’s 
Turkification policies and instead sought to hold on to their individual identities. This 
resistance to accepting a Turkish identity was particularly evident in the use of 
languages other than Turkish. By continuing to use other languages, ethnic and 
religious minority groups attempted to preserve their long-standing status as semi-
autonomous communities with their own culture. That this resistance to Turkishness 
was so visible, domestically and internationally, was particularly troubling to the 
Republican leadership.191 The Kemalists took a number of steps to crack down on 
the use of languages other than Turkish in response to this display of perceived 
defiance. The Republic’s adoption of harsh language policies became one of the 
Kemalists’ most important strategies for enforcing a collective Turkish identity.  
 
The Turkish Language Society (Türk Dil Kurumu), founded in 1932, carried out 
Turkish language-related activities in support of the state’s official ideology. The 
Turkish Language Society also played a significant role in the politicization of 
language during the Republican period.192 Its foundation was one of the main turning 
points of the Kemalist language revolution. Among the Society’s responsibilities was 
the purification of Turkish language through the purging of Arabic and Persian 
words.193 By replacing the Arabic script with the Latin script and eliminating the use 
of Arabic and Persian words, Kemalists sought to correct the faults of the Ottoman 
past. To justify these changes, the Kemal described the Arabic script as a barrier to 
the modernization process and the influence of Arabic and Persian as ‘destructive’ 
and ‘unenlightened;194  
 
So long as Turkish was written from right to left, it could never properly express the ideals of 
European civilization. The picturesque involutions and intricacies of Arabic script afforded a 
psychological background to the Oriental mentality, which stood as the real enemy of the 
Republic.195 
 
The script reform was thus a tool the Kemalist government used to force Turks to 
forget their Ottoman-Islamic past. Through the standardization of language the 
Kemalists tried to weaken non-Turkish identities. Turkish became the official 
language of the state and thus the official language of the education system.196 That 
Turks’ language was no loner written in the script of the Quran also distanced them 
from religion. The script reform enabled the government to exert more control over 
the spread of information through restrictions on the publishing and re-printing of 
documents. As the government gained more control over the publishing process, 
writings and publications critical of the government declined until a point where they 
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were basically non-existent. This decline in criticism went hand-in-hand with an 
increase in state-sponsored knowledge production.197 
 
Immediately after the script reform and language purification process the Kemalist 
government swiftly pushed the new Turkish language on the population. In 1928 the 
Turkish Parliament passed a law that stated citizens had no more than one year to 
switch to the new language. The government then embarked on a nation-wide 
campaign to rapidly educate the public by enforcing the new alphabet in primary 
schools and establishing a system of mandatory adult education (Millet 
Mektepleri). 198  The ‘Citizen! Speak Turkish!’ campaign also pushed the new 
language on the population and attempted to eliminate minority languages from the 
public sphere.  
 
The speed at which the government carried out this transformation caused 
significant problems for the public. In the decade that followed the script reform and 
purification process much of the population was unable to understand the new 
version of Turkish. The language reformers removed many Arabic and Persian 
words before finding suitable replacements. However, these practical challenges did 
not stop the government from forcing the public to use the new language. In the 
1930 the government arrested hundreds of people for speaking languages other 
than Turkish. Turkish speakers also harassed non-Turkish speakers and violently 
forced them to speak Turkish. The strict timeline for the public’s adoption of the new 
Turkish language was non only a problem for those who did not previously speak a 
version of Turkish. While the state forced non-Turkish speakers to learn a new 
language, it also forced those who spoke the old version of Turkish to relearn a 
language that had once been familiar to them.199  
 
The Kemalists largely overestimated and disregarded the willingness of non-Turks to 
adopt Turkishness. It was not enough for the state to force its linguistic, social, and 
cultural policies on the population. Non-ethnic Turkish communities had their own 
identities and were not passive actors whose identities could be easily molded by 
state policies. For the state’s Turkification policies to be effective, there needed to be 
a ‘readiness’ of the people to redefine themselves as Turks and adopt state-defined 
values of Turkishness. These persistent, harsh policies wore down pre-existing 
identities and led to the adoption and resistance of different levels of Turkish identity 
among the population.200  
 
Conclusion 
 
The Kemalists sought to bring about a civilizational shift in which a secular, Turkish 
nation would replace the religious community inherited from the Ottoman Empire.201 
In their efforts to do so, the Kemalist enacted a series of rapid, ruthless reforms that 
are often described as ‘radical.’ In comparison to the reforms of the Young Turk era, 
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the Kemalists often took their policies further and implemented them faster. 
Ideologically speaking, the Kemalists also pursed the most extreme versions of 
many concepts popularized during the Young Turk era. The following chapter will 
compare each movement’s stance on some of these concepts in an attempt to 
highlight the differences and similarities that existed between them. 
Chapter 4: In Comparison 
 
This chapter compares and analyzes examples of discontinuity in the ideology and 
practices of the Young Turk and Kemalist movements. Through a comparison of key 
concepts, this chapter aims to show the inconsistencies in the Young Turk 
movement’s thought and practices; the main dissimilarities between the two 
movements; and the commonalities between the Kemalists and the garbcılar faction. 
 
 
Ziya Gökalp’s Link to Kemalism  
 
When retracing the path from Young Turk to Kemalist ideology, one must note that 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries ideas constantly fluctuated as a result 
of the changing circumstances and influences of the time. Scholars often point to 
Gökalp as one of the main influences of Kemalist ideology. But which Gökalp, and 
when? Gökalp’s personal ideology underwent numerous transformations in the latter 
part of his life. As Heyd’s research on Gökalp shows, Gökalp was not consistent or 
systematic in his thoughts. In reviewing the writings from different points of his life, 
one can see several changes in his opinions as well as inner contradictions.202  
 
Initially, Gökalp was not a staunch supporter of Westernization. Even once he leaned 
into adopting more aspects of Western civilization and culture, he never advocated 
its absolute adoption. Early on Gökalp also embraced the development of a Turkish 
culture alongside the continued allegiance to the Ottoman Empire, just like many of 
his CUP colleagues. He argued for a form of Ottoman unity that incorporated 
aspects of Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism. He believed these concepts not only 
complemented each other, but also were necessary for the survival of the Empire. 
He later shifted his view as the Empire suffered losses in the Balkan Wars and the 
Turks became an even larger majority of the population. At this time Gökalp moved 
farther away from Ottomanism and increasingly focused on the formation of a 
distinctly Turkish shared identity. From this point forward Gökalp’s contribution to 
Turkish nationalism very much influenced the development of Turkish national 
identity under the Kemalists. It is therefore important to emphasize that Kemalist 
links to Gökalp’s ideology were at their strongest point after he departed from his 
original beliefs.  
 
Just like many Young Turks, Gökalp’s ideology underwent many transformations. 
Gökalp’s ideology certainly influenced that of the Kemalists, particularly regarding 
the development of Turkish identity, but Kemalist ideology in turn influenced 
Gökalp’s. While Gökalp’s views on Turkish nationalism grew stronger throughout the 
 
202 For more details on Ziya Gökalp’s life and ideology see Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: 
The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp.  
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late years of the Ottoman Empire, his original beliefs (a mixture of Ottomanism and 
pan-Turkism) did not fall in line with the ideology later adopted by the Kemalists. 
Gökalp also remained supportive of the inclusion of non-ethnic Turks in the state’s 
definition of Turkishness, despite the Kemalists’ shift towards an identity where race 
and ethnicity were core components: 
 
There are fellow citizens in our country whose ancestors have come from Albania or Arabia 
sometime in the past. If they have been educated as Turks, and have become used to 
working for the Turkish ideal, we must not set them apart from other citizens. How can we 
consider as aliens those who have shared not only our blessings but also our misfortunes? In 
particular, how can we say, “you are not Turks” to those among them who have made great 
sacrifices and have performed great service for the Turkish nation?203 
 
This is not to say that Gökalp did not make significant contributions to the 
development of Kemalist ideology and practices. Instead, it shows the need for 
current scholarship to acknowledge the areas where Gökalp and other contributors 
to Kemalist ideology differed and where they made compromises in their personal 
beliefs.  
Embracing Western Civilization  
 
There was a wide variation between the members of the Young Turk movement 
regarding the necessary extent of Westernizing reforms. Berkes divides supporters 
and opponents of westernizing reforms into three schools of thought: Islamists, 
Turkists, and Westernists (garbcilar).204 If we place these groups on a spectrum, the 
Islamists would be at one end, the Turkists in the middle (but closer to the 
Westernists), and the Westernists at the other end.  
 
The stance of the Islamists on Westernization can be best summarized by the 
following quotes, both which appeared in the Young Turk publication Sırat-ı 
Müstakim: 
 
European behavior is utterly contrary not only to Islam but to the principles of any social 
life…What painful wounds the European civil laws have opened on social life in terms of 
morals and ethics is obvious…It is true that we have…to benefit from European civilization, 
industry and knowledge; and yet it is absolutely imperative for us…not to allow their customs, 
morals and conduct to enter into our countries.205 
 
…If we ever run our affairs according to European principles, the moral degeneration, which 
has fallen upon them will be inevitable for us.206 
 
The Islamists strongly opposed the Empire adopting anything but science and 
technology from the West, as they believed Western morals were contrary to Islam 
and would ruin the Empire. In discussions of the Ottoman Empire embracing 
Western civilization, supporters of different schools of thought often placed aspects 
into “good” and “bad” categories. One Islamist, Musa Kazim, even attempted to 
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create an “Islamic formula” to determine which aspects of Western civilization the 
Empire should and should not adopt.207 
 
Throughout the nineteenth century anti-Western sentiments appeared in publications 
such as Sura-yi Ummet and Türk, where authors described European powers as 
imperialistic and enemies of the Ottoman Empire.208 The West’s stance during the 
Balkan Wars reinforced many of the anti-Western views already held by members of 
the Young Turk movement. European powers’ reluctance to intervene on behalf of 
the Empire was widely criticized in Young Turk publications and later in its members’ 
memoirs.209  Enver Pasha, one of the most prominent military leaders in the CUP, 
was amongst those who believed that the West was the primary cause of the 
Empire’s misery and suffering.210  
 
The stance of the Islamists was drastically different from the Westernists, who 
believed not only in the adoption of Western technologies and sciences, but also 
culture and morals. The Westernist movement fell under the leadership of Abdullah 
Cevdet, the most ardent secularist of the Yong Turk movement.  Following the 
Balkan Wars, the Westernist movement split into two wings: one under the 
leadership of Celal Nuri and the other under Cevdet. Nuri was critical of the West but 
supported partial Westernization, that is, the “adoption of Western science and 
technology and preservation of Ottoman culture, a major component of which was 
Islam.”211 In the aftermath of the Balkan Wars Nuri’s views on the West continued to 
grow apart from Cevdet’s and the two began a widely publicized argument. In 1913 
Nuri wrote in İctihad that, “friendship for the West is the vilest of all crimes I can 
imagine. A nation incapable of hating the West is doomed to extinction.” 212  In 
response, Cevdet published an article in which he said: 
 
We deemed every good thing coming from them bad. We are the culprits of all our plights. 
We are to be accused…The relation between Europe and us is the relation between strength 
and weakness, between science and ignorance…Yes, Europe means supremacy; let hatred 
of it be far from me. My hatred is turned against those things that are the obstacles to our 
attaining power equal to that of Europe…Our mortal enemy is our own inertia, ignorance, 
fanaticism, and our own blind following of tradition…The West is our teacher; to love it is to 
love science, progress, material and moral advancement…We have to understand one 
thing—there are not two civilizations, there is only one to which to turn, and that is Western 
civilization, which we must take into our hands whether it be rosy or thorny…213 
  
Although Nuri recognized that the Ottoman state needed to adopt Western material 
improvements, he rejected Western cultural, social, and spiritual values. This was in 
stark contrast to Cevdet, who believed in the complete adoption of Western 
civilization and the complete separation of religion and state. Cevdet and his fellow 
 
207 Ibid. p. 362. 
208 Türkiye’de Almanlar, Türk  (22 February 1906). No. 119.; Türkiye’de Almanlar, Türk (29 March 
1906). No. 124. 
209  Such as Cemal Pasha’s Memories of a Turkish Statesman: 1913-1919; Cahit, Tanin (10 
September 1914). 
210 Hanioğlu, Kendi Mektuplarında Enver Pasha [Enver Pasha in his own letters]. p. 242. 
211 Buzpinar, “Celal Nuri’s Concepts of Westernization and Religion.” p. 249. 
212 Nuri, “Sime-I Husumet,” Ictihad (1913). No. 88. 
213 Cevdet, “Sime-i Muhhabet,” Ictihad (1913). No 89. Referenced in Berkes, The Development of 
Secularism in Turkey. p. 357-358. 
 45 
garbcılar also believed Islam created a mental barrier that kept Muslims from 
understanding both their own ills and Western civilization.  
 
Cevdet himself was well known among Ottoman intellectuals for his idea of a 
Westernized society where religion would play no role.214 As Cevdet continued to 
publish these seemingly extreme views in his journal, Ictihad, the CUP distanced 
themselves from him and his anti-religious stances. Nuri and Cevdet’s stances 
represent the divide that existed even among the garbcılar and further highlight the 
multiple strands of opinions that existed within the broader Young Turk movement. 
Not only can its members be divided into three broad schools of thought, but also by 
their extent of support for concepts within each school of thought.  
 
It is important to emphasize that Nuri was not the only supporter of partial 
westernization; other intellectuals, including many prominent leaders of the Young 
Turk movement, also shared this attitude. This idea was widely accepted among 
Turkist (and Islamist) intellectuals, while Cevdet’s appeal for total westernization was 
cast off as ‘radical’. Berkes, notes that:  
 
The Westernists’ ideas deviated radically from the prevalent view of Westernization, 
formulated by Ahmed Midhat. The essence of Westernization in their eyes would be a radical 
moral and mental transformation. The greatest problem was to cast aside the old system of 
values in order to develop a new morality based upon the Western system of values. In other 
words, modernization was to the new Westernists a cultural and moral issues far more than a 
material one.215 
 
Neither overly anti- nor pro-Western, the Turkists partially accepted Western 
civilization but also believed the ‘radical’ Westernists views promoted by Cevdet and 
his followers were a threat to the development of a collective Turkish identity. 
However, the Turkists believed in the adoption of far more aspects of Western 
civilization than the Islamists. The Turkists opted for Turkish culture that was neither 
overtly Western nor Islamic and believed that without Turkish culture there could be 
no genuine reform or modernization of the Empire. The Turkists also did not flat out 
reject religion and thought it would still play a limited role in their vision of a 
secularized society. Gökalp identified himself as a Turkist but also shared the views 
of some ‘moderate’ Westernists.216 He embraced a Turkish identity that had Turkish, 
Islamic, and European characteristics.217 
 
Unlike Gökalp and other moderate Young Turks, the Kemalists did not differentiate 
between civilization (in their minds: science and technology) and culture. The 
Kemalists thought it was ‘unnecessary and difficult’ to separate the two from each 
other and advocated for the complete adoption of Western civilization, thus aligning 
their beliefs with Cevdet and the garbcılar more than Gökalp. The many Kemalist 
reforms aimed at adopting Western cultural exemplify how they embraced the culture 
and norms of Western civilization. 
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As detailed above, the vast majority of Young Turk intellectuals believed in some 
form of Westernization, yet there was much debate as to what type and extent of 
Westernization reforms should be implemented. If we look at the Young Turk 
members’ support for Westernization on a spectrum, Kemal and his supporters 
would appear at the far end with the garbcılar. The Kemalists described themselves 
as the most extreme Westernists and believed in the total and complete adoption of 
Western civilization, just like Cevdet and his fellow garbcılar.  
 
The CUP’s Central Committee widely perceived Cevdet to be the most radical 
member of the Young Turk movement with regards to his stance on Westernization. 
As Cevdet continuously published his ideas in journals and other publications the 
Central Committee attempted to distance themselves from him, as his views did not 
fall in line with theirs. The CUP felt that Cevdet’s extreme stance on the complete 
adoption of Western civilization and the exclusion of religion from a unified identity 
would threaten their efforts to appeal to greater the Ottoman population. Cevdet and 
his fellow garbcılar aligned more closely with the members of the Kemalists 
movement than the leaders of the CUP. Cevdet’s wing of the garbcılar undoubtedly 
influenced Kemalist reforms of the early Turkish Republic.  Kemal himself even 
acknowledged this, telling Cevdet in 1925: “Doctor, until now you have written about 
many things. Now we may bring them to realization.”218 Kemal also publicly spoke of 
the Kemalists desire for the total and complete adoption of Western civilization: 
 
We have to be civilized persons in every aspect…Our opinions, our thoughts will be civilized 
from head to toe. We shall not take heed of nonsensical words. Look at the entire Turkish and 
Islamic world, in what grave and difficult situation they are because their ideas and thoughts 
are not adapted to the reforms made by imperative civilization…219 
 
The Westernization plan put forth by the garbcılar in 1913 laid out many of the 
‘radical’ ideas the Kemalist regime would later adopt during the early years of the 
Republic.220 In their plan, the garbcılar criticized ‘outdated’ practices and manners 
they believed did not fall in line with Western civilization. The plan’s 
recommendations included: abolishing dervish lodges, medreses and the fez (and 
replacing it with a European style hat), adopting modern clothing and European 
‘good’ manners, and the emancipation of women. Shortly after the establishment of 
the Turkish Republic the Kemalist regime began implementing many of these ideas 
and in some cases took them one step further.  
 
In their pursuit of modernity the Kemalists “openly and wholeheartedly chose to 
imitate the West, even in purely superficial things.”221 A central aspect of Kemalist 
reforms was the desire to change the outward appearance of society. Kemalists’ 
insistence on changing the people’s appearances was tied to their belief that one’s 
outward appearance reflected their inner feelings and thoughts. Kemalists hoped to 
create a transformation in society’s manners and reasoning ability by implementing 
stringent rules on individual’s clothing, language, and overall style.222 In 1925 the 
government enforced a strict dress code that forbid individuals from wearing 
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traditional Ottoman headgear, the turban, and fez, and instead required them to wear 
Western-style hats. For women, the state strongly discouraged veiling. To inspire the 
expansion of Western clothing styles the government increased imports of European 
goods and spread images of Europeans.223 During the 1920s, the Kemalist-aligned 
newspaper Cumhuriyet frequently published images of men and women dressed in 
Western-styled clothing to show the public examples of how they should dress.224 
 
Kemalists tied the embrace of Western clothing styles and appearances directly to 
the success of the nation: “There is no way to be successful with turbans and robes, 
now we have proven to the world that we are a civilized nation.”225 The same went 
for Western morals and traditions: “…nations cannot maintain their existence by age-
old rotten mentalities and by tradition-worshipping…Superstitions and nonsense 
have to be thrown out of our heads.” 226  The Kemalists’ stance on adopting all 
aspects of Western civilization was very clear and reforms in the early Republican 
era directly supported this stance.  
Violence and Forced Assimilation  
 
Regarding the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities, both the Young Turk and 
Kemalist leadership carried out violent, inhumane policies with the intention of 
homogenizing the population. However, their motivations for carrying out these 
policies and the extent of them differed. While the Young Turks carried out genocide 
against the Armenian community with the aim of further homogenizing the Empire by 
physical eliminating them, the Kemalists carried out harsh, violent measures aimed 
at forcibly assimilating minority groups and eliminating their identities. This does not 
mean, however, that there was no overlap in the intentions and policies of the Young 
Turks and the Kemalists.  
 
For the members of the Young Turk movement, the primary goal was saving the 
state, which they attempted to do through strengthening the position of the Ottoman 
Muslims, and later the majority Turkish population. The Balkan Wars contributed to 
the Young Turks’ growing mistrust towards religious and ethnic minority 
communities, who they saw as disloyal to the Empire. The CUP leadership used this 
goal to legitimize their violent measures against the non-Muslim populations of the 
Empire, particularly the Ottoman Armenian community. According to Ottoman 
population censuses from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Armenians 
and Greeks were the two largest ethnic groups after the Turks.227 The size of the 
Armenian community, along with its perceived resistance to CUP policies and desire 
for autonomy, deepened the CUP leadership’s pre-existing belief that the Armenians 
posed a threat to the existence of the Empire.   
 
As early as 1909, merely one year after the revolution, members of the Young Turk 
leadership—namely, Talat Pasha, Doctor Nizam Bey and Behaeddin Sakir—began 
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discussing the possibility of forcefully homogenizing Ottoman territory. The Young 
Turks discussed this idea in detail until 1914, when they put it into action. In 1910, 
the CUP held a secret conference Salonika where its leaders produced a document 
outlining the decision to proceed with violent measures against the Empire’s 
Armenian population.228 The document, which officials at the British Foreign Office 
gave the name ‘The Ten Commandments’, outlined a number of actions to be taken: 
 
Close all Armenian societies, and arrest all who worked against the Government at any time 
among them and send them into provinces such as Baghdad and Mosul, and wipe them out 
either on the road or there; 
 
Apply measures to exterminate all males under 50, priests and teachers, leave girls and 
children to be Islamized; 
 
Carry away the families of all who succeed in escaping and apply measures to cut them off 
from all connection with their native place; 
 
On the ground that Armenian officials may be spies, expel and drive them out absolutely from 
every Government department or post; 
 
Kill off in an appropriate manner all Armenians in the Army.229 
 
Additionally, the document emphasized the need for these actions to be done 
simultaneously, in order to leave the Armenians no time to defend themselves.230 
While a number of CUP officials attended the conference mentioned above, there is 
still much debate as to whether or not lower-ranking CUP members and members 
outside the Central Committee were aware of the plan proposed in ‘The Ten 
Commandments’, and if they were, to what extent.231 
 
The ruling CUP’s view of the Armenian population as a barrier to progress and a 
threat to the Empire’s security sharpened after the Balkan Wars. The CUP observed 
the Armenian community’s increasing desire for autonomy and feared their possible 
separation from the Empire, something that was unthinkable to the CUP after the 
territorial losses in the Balkan Wars. The Balkan Wars amplified the CUP 
leadership’s efforts to save the Empire through weakening the positions of the 
Empire’s religious and ethnic minority communities. 
 
The procedures outlined in above-mentioned document were well under way by 
1914. The CUP chose to respond to the challenged presented by the Armenian 
population in the most inhumane way, with the Armenian genocide. By 1916 the 
Armenian population of the Empire drastically decreased due to widespread 
massacres, forced emigrations, and violence against the Armenian community.232 As 
part of these measures against the Armenian population the CUP leadership 
enacted the Deportation Law in 1915, under which they forcibly exiled any subjects 
that opposed the government during times of war. The Deportation Law largely 
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targeted the Armenian population, but also affected other religious and ethnic 
minority groups, Assyrians and Kurds.233  
 
The Kemalists justified their nation-building project as one of necessity. They saw 
the creation of a homogenous nation-state as a requirement of Western acceptance 
and the key to joining the Western world.234 However, the population of the new 
Republic, while overwhelmingly ethnic Turkish and Muslim, was still far from 
homogeneous.  This prompted the Kemalists to embark on an increasingly intense 
program of Turkification throughout the first two decades of the Republic.   
 
The 1924 Constitution’s proclamation that, “The People of Turkey, regardless of 
religion and race, are Turks as regards citizenship,” evidences the government’s first 
attempt to include ethnic and religious minority groups in its vision of Turkishness.235 
The Kemalists envisioned the creation of a unified population whose identities 
aligned with a state-produced definition of Turkishness. Since the population of the 
new Republic was by no means homogenous, the Kemalists attempted to 
consolidate minority groups with the expectation that they would willingly assimilate. 
Kemalists hoped that the inclusion of ethnic and religious minorities in their vision of 
Turkish national identity would strengthen the state’s authority. 236  This directly 
contrasted with the Young Turks, who opted for the exclusion of ethnic and religious 
minorities instead of the consolidation of them. The Kemalists viewed the Kurdish 
population of the Republic similarly to how the Young Turks viewed the Armenian 
population: a challenge that needed a solution. However, the Kemalists and the 
Young Turks approached these challenges in different ways.  
 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Ottoman state had an ambivalent 
attitude towards the Kurdish population. At that time the Kurds had an indisputable 
public presence in the Empire; they had their own political, social, and cultural 
organizations. Following the proclamation of the Republic in 1923 there was a 
definitive shift in attitude towards the Kurdish population. In attempting to mold the 
population into a homogeneous body of loyal, Turkish citizens, the government made 
the decision to ignore the multiplicity of identities that existed in the Republic, 
particularly Kurdish identity.237  
 
The Kemalists used the language in the Treaty of Lausanne to justify their actions 
towards the Kurds and Kurdish identity. The Treaty protected the rights of minorities, 
including their right to language. However, the Treaty defined minorities in terms of 
religion, not ethnicity. This meant that only non-Muslims, such as Orthodox Greek 
Christians, Armenians, Assyrian Christians, and Jews, officially received protections 
under the Treaty. The Kemalists used the fact that the Kurdish community was not 
protected as a minority under the Treaty to legitimize their harsh attempts to forcibly 
assimilate the Kurds and effectively reduce their visibility in the new Republic.238  
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As the Kemalists attempted to unify the new Republic under one identity they tried to 
prohibit the Kurds, and other groups, from operating outside of this identity. Through 
increasingly intense Turkification policies the Kemalists sought to eliminate non-
Turkish identities from the public sphere. These measures applied to all ethnic and 
religious minorities, but overwhelmingly targeted the Kurds.239 In the most heavily 
populated Kurdish areas of the Republic the government inscribed nationalistic 
symbols and slogans on buildings and destroyed monuments that referenced the 
Kurds. The state closed Kurdish schools and institutions, ceased Kurdish-language 
publications, and banned references to ‘Kurds’, ‘Kurdish’, or ‘Kurdistan’.240  
 
The Kurds were the largest non-Turkish speaking community in the new Republic. 
They were also the ethnic community that showed the most visible resistance to 
Turkification reforms. Between 1923 and 1938 eighteen rebellions broke out, 17 of 
which took place in the Republic’s Kurdish provinces.241 The Kemalists responded to 
the Kurdish community’s defiance with strict, violent policies and crackdowns. 
However, unlike the Young Turks before them, the Kemalists did not resort to 
genocide when taking action against the Kurdish community. This points to the 
Kemalists’ underlying belief that the government could succeed in forcing the Kurds 
to assimilate, which they believed would in turn strengthen their authority. The Young 
Turks resorted to more violent measures in part because they realized they would 
not be able to succeed in homogenizing the population through a shared identity. 
The Young Turks’ inability to come to a consensus on whether to pursue 
Ottomanism, pan-Turkism, or pan-Islamism certainly contributed to the difficulty they 
faced in attempting to unite the Ottoman population under a single identity. 
 
The Kemalist government’s systematic denial and oppression of Kurdish identity 
through violent Turkification policies concentrated on what Haig refers to as the 
‘invisibilisation’ of the Kurdish identity.242 The evolution of the Kemalist narrative on 
Turkish identity also shows how they never fully gave up on this goal. By the 1930s 
the Kemalist narrative implied race and ethnicity were core components of 
Turkishness, yet the government continued to force the Republic’s ethnic and 
religious minorities to speak, appear, and behave as ‘Turks’. Cagaptay points out 
that while Kemalist ideology focused on Turkish race and ethnicity, the government 
“kept the avenues of assimilation open to those who were not ethnically Turkish.”243 
 
In his research Zeydaniloğlu says the government treated the Kurds as Turks who 
had forgotten their Turkishness.  This was the Kemalists’ solution to finding a way to 
include the Kurds in their version of Turkish national identity. This hope to integrate 
the Kurdish population into the nation-state guided Kemalists’ forced Turkification 
policies.244 While the Kemalists suppressed Kurdish rebellions and resistance, often 
violently, they did not seek to physically eliminate the Kurds from the Republic. 
Instead, they sought to eliminate their identity.  
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The Kemalists anticipated that ethnic and religious minorities would assimilate and 
follow the set guidelines of Turkishness put forth by the state. These individuals were 
expected to declare their allegiance to the state, adopt Turkish culture and language, 
and embrace their Turkish national identity. However, this did not happen. Not 
surprisingly, these groups pushed back against the state’s harsh Turkification 
policies in an effort to hold on to their ethnic and religious identities. The Kemalists 
did not tolerate this and used the defiance of the Republic’s minorities as justification 
to implement policies that were even more extreme and restrictive. The Kemalist 
regime also cracked down on any and all of its opponents – especially Kurdish 
religious leaders and former members of the CUP.  
 
In 1925, Shekih Said, a Kurdish religious leader, led a rebellion in Diyarbakir and 
Mardin that aimed to revive the recently abolished Caliphate. To mobilize support, 
Sheikh Said drew on elements of Kurdish nationalism. The Kemalists quickly and 
violently suppressed the rebellion, sentencing nearly fifty people to death for their 
involvement. The Kemalists used the Sheikh Said Rebellion as an opportunity to 
further consolidate the concept of Turkishness as a modern, secular, national 
identity. 245  After the rebellion the Kemalists imposed stricter regulations on the 
Kurdish population, expanding limitations on their language and culture. As part of 
these restrictions the state issued the “Breakdown of Turkish Unity” circular, which 
forbid citizens from using the names ‘Kurds’, ‘Laz’, ‘Circassian’, ‘Kurdistan’, or 
‘Lazistan’ and from discussing these topics.246  
 
To expand control over the Republic’s religious and ethnic minority populations the 
state enacted two different resettlement policies, similar to their Young Turk 
predecessors. The first Resettlement Law, enacted in 1926, prohibited non-Muslims 
from the former Empire from immigrating to the Republic.247 The second, enacted in 
1934, stated that anyone the state believed was not fully Turkish could be resettled 
by the state.248 This law categorized the country into zones tied to different levels of 
‘Turkishness’. The state used this law to strategically resettle ethnic and religious 
minorities in distinctly Turkish areas, thus dispersing concentrations of non-Muslim, 
non-Turkish communities throughout the country.249 Article 11 of this law directly 
targeted the Kurds and ordered them to be distributed so they made up no more 
than ten percent of a district’s population.250 
 
On top of these measures, the Kemalists arranged a forced population transfer 
between Greece and Turkey in 1923. The agreement was based on religion and 
ethnicity and did not take language into consideration. As a result, many Greek-
speaking Muslims and Turkish-speaking Greek Orthodox Christians were forced 
from their homes. Approximately 1.2 million Turkish-speaking Greek Orthodox 
Christians were sent to Greece while 600,000 Greek-speaking Muslims came to 
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Turkey.251 Here we see similarities with the CUP, who ordered the exchange of 
200,000 Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians from Western Thrace and Anatolia in 
1914. 
Boundaries of Nationalism 
 
The Young Turk movement constantly evolved. The CUP took on multiple identities 
based on transformations in its ideology, leadership, and membership. Taking into 
consideration the size of the Young Turk movement, it was inevitable that not all its 
members would be in agreement on many of the issues championed by the CUP’s 
Central Committee. Early on the CUP proposed a multiplicity of solutions to the 
Empire’s demise as a way to attract more support. The CUP strategically used 
rhetoric that catered to the Muslim/Turkish population, non-Muslim/non-Turkish 
population, or the Western powers.  
 
The frequent contradictions of decisions and ideas within the Young Turk movement 
evidence the disconnect that existed between the Central Committee, the CUP’s 
executive branch, its provincial branches, and smaller factions and offshoots. The 
CUP’s official publications and communications include numerous examples of 
members promoting one policy while the Central Committee simultaneously 
attempted to implement a contradicting policy. 252  In British Foreign Office 
documents, British officials noted the use of conflicting rhetoric. They observed that 
while the Young Turks did endorse Pan-Islamism in many parts of the Empire, it was 
“discouraged in regions where it might endanger Turkish authority.”253 Numerous 
memos between British foreign officials between the years 1914 and 1919 further 
highlight the confusion over the CUP’s ideology and practices. 
 
One document notes that while the CUP adopted a Pan-Islamic program by 1911, 
one of the party’s official organs also said that, “the pursuit of the Pan-Islamic 
designs...would be contrary to our dearest interests.”254 Another memo received from 
the British Foreign Secretary in 1917 states, “To my certain knowledge, the Pan-
Islamic ideas are being taught at schools…this gives us an idea of the vast efforts 
being made to advance the gospel of Pan-Islamism.” 255  Another memo to the 
Foreign Office in 1919 discusses an article published in the Cairo-based, Arabic-
language monthly publication Manar and said that Enver Bey Pasha was “quoted for 
the declaration that a new constitution would have nothing to do with Pan-
Islamism”.256 Yet another set of memos discussed British officials’ understanding that 
“a number of prominent Young Turks were actively working with the Khedive and 
Nationalist party along Pan-Islamic lines” and that “Pan-Islamic activities have 
become more intensive.” The same memo also noted that,  
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The Young Turks…who are far from devout Moslems, found the Pan-Islamic force ready 
made and assert that they have to use it internally to counteract national tendencies among 
the Mohammedan Arabs and Kurds of the Empire, and in foreign affairs as a lever to compel 
foreign governments, e.g., that of Great Britain, to hesitate when there is a question of brining 
pressure to bear in the case of a conflict of interest.257 
 
These documents provide examples of the confusion that surrounded the aims and 
ideology of the Young Turk movement during this time. An analysis of Türk Yurdu 
provides additional examples of how CUP leadership simultaneously promoted 
aspects of Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkish nationalism. In their study on Turkish 
nationalist content in Türk Yurdu, Balkilic and Dolek note that, 
 
…one can see the articles which stated Islam was historically a vital element of Turkish 
identity and the idea of religion was not by definition against the idea of nationalism, and the 
articles which elaborated Islam as one of the causes of the disappearance of Turkish 
nationalist identity at the same time in the journal.258 
 
Throughout the journal’s publication there was no clear departure from the ideas of 
Ottomanism or Islamism, though there was less of a focus on these ideas after the 
Balkan Wars. The lack of a distinct rupture in the CUP’s ideology contributes to the 
ongoing difficulty in identifying and analyzing the Young Turk movement’s official 
ideology. It also points to the many variations in the movement’s ideology since 
some of the journal’s authors, like Yusuf Akçura, used it as a platform to express 
their personal beliefs while others used it to cater to non-Turkish or non-Muslim 
readers. 259 
 
More than anything, the multiplicity of ideas put forth by the CUP evidence their 
opportunism, a trait they have in common with the leaders of the Kemalist 
movement. Just like the leaders of the CUP, Kemal and his colleagues used Islamic 
rhetoric and undertones to mobilize Ottoman Muslims to join the nationalist 
movement’s efforts, which they said were in support of defending and protecting the 
Sultanate and Caliphate. Among the goals they outlined in the declaration of the 
Sivas Congress in 1919 and the Turkish National pact were the “conservation,” 
“safeguarding” and “continued existence” of the Sultanate and the Caliphate as well 
as the “defense of the rights of the Caliphate and the throne.”260  
 
However, the Kemalists’ use of Islamic rhetoric came to an abrupt halt upon the 
establishment of the Republic. Upon the proclamation of the Republic they promptly 
dissolved the Caliphate and Sultanate and with it their need to gather support from 
the Muslim conservatives. From this point on the Kemalists were clear about their 
intentions to create a Turkish nation state and increase the separation between 
religion and society. They no longer attempted to appeal to the population’s religious 
sentiments. Instead, the Kemalists wanted to call attention to the population’s link to 
its ethnic-Turkish ancestry. In doing this the Kemalists strategically produced broad 
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definitions of Turkishness and Turkish identity, leaving them open for interpretation 
as they saw fit.  The two statements that follow exemplify the Kemalists’ use of broad 
language to appeal to the Republic’s population: 
 
“The People of Turkey, regardless of religion and race are Turks as regards citizenship.”261  
- Türk Anayasası, 1924 
 
“Any individual within the Republic of Turkey, whatever his faith, who speaks Turkish, grows 
up with the Turkish culture and adopts the Turkish ideal, is a Turk.”262 
- Tarih IV Turkiye Cumhuriyeti, 1931 
 
During the Ottoman era the boundaries of pan-Turkism and Turkish nationalism were 
not always clearly defined. Often the difference between the two was a matter of 
emphasis rather than a sharp division.263 When the Kemalists rose to power, this 
was not the case. Kemalists firmly rejected all notions of pan-Turkism, choosing 
instead to adopt full-on Turkish nationalism.  
 
Even prior the proclamation of the Republic, in 1921, Kemal spoke of a new policy 
that would include Turks living within the “national frontiers” of Turkey, effectively 
shutting down the idea that Turkish nationalism would extend beyond the country’s 
borders.264 This marked a distinctive shift away from pan-Turkism and towards a 
form of civic nationalism based on one’s loyalty to the state.265 The state’s focus on 
the Republic’s borders as a requirement of Turkish identity and citizenship was 
arguably one of the most consistent aspects of Kemalists national identity. While 
there was some flexibility in the racial and ethnic requirements for Turkishness, the 
territorial requirements remained fixed. In choosing to tie Turkish nationalism to the 
boundaries of the Republic, the Kemalists closed the door to pan-Turkism. Kemalists 
flatly rejected Ottomanism, pan-Turkism, and pan-Islamism and instead pursued a 
version of Turkish nationalism that centered on lifting up and developing the 
inhabitants of Anatolia, the proclaimed homeland of the Turks.  
 
The Kemalists remained conflicted over two main aspects of Turkish nationalism. 
They wanted to appeal to the emotions of Turks living within the Republic’s borders 
but did not want to over-emphasize cultural links to Turks living outside the Republic. 
The Kemalists did not support pan-Turkism, but struggled with how to connect Turks 
in the Republic to their Turkish heritage and history without also appealing to Turks 
in Central Asia. While the Kemalists took decisive steps to rid the Republic of pan-
Turkist sentiments, they simultaneously made an effort to create a collective 
consciousness about Turks’ links to their ancestors.266  
 
The Kemalists did not want to promote a strictly ethnic definition of Turkish 
nationalism since it would extend to Turks outside the Republic’s borders. Ethnic 
requirements for Turkish nationalism would also exclude the Republic’s non-Turkish 
groups, particularly those in Anatolia, which the state sought to include in its vision of 
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Turkish national identity. Kemal and his supporters believed their inclusion in this 
vision would help strengthen the legitimacy and authority of the Republic.267 During 
the Turkish-Greek War Kemal and the nationalists received the support of many 
Turkish and non-Turkish Muslims living in Anatolia and Eastern Thrace. They helped 
fight for the area that would go on to become the Republic of Turkey, which they saw 
as their homeland.268 These inhabitants included many Muslim refugees from the 
Balkans and Caucasus who resettled in Anatolia during the nineteenth century. For 
these inhabitants who had fled inter-religious war and violence, it was important for 
them to claim and defend their Anatolian homeland.269  
 
The Kemalists actively suppressed pan-Turkism because it emphasized unity with 
Turks outside of the Republic’s borders, a collective identity that the state had less 
control over. The restriction and eventual disbandment of the Turkish Hearth 
organization’s activities in the early years of the Republic exemplifies one of the 
steps Kemalists took to tightly control the spread of pan-Turkist sentiments. The 
Turkish Hearth organization, originally established in 1912 to promote a mix of 
Turkism and Turkish nationalism, was essential in the spread of pan-Turkist ideas. 
The activities of the Turkish Hearth had no defined boundaries, as the territory of the 
Ottoman Empire consistently shifted during the centuries leading up to its collapse. 
Its efforts were therefore not tied to the borders of the Empire at all times.270 
 
After the Greco-Turkish War the Kemalists brought the Turkish Hearth under the 
control of the government and shifted the focus of its activities. The Kemalists firmly 
believed in a Turkish nationalism that did not extend beyond the borders of the 
Republic, thus they did not support pan-Turkism. To bring the Turkish Hearth in line 
with this belief the Kemalists redefined the role and purpose of the Turkish Hearth to 
focus on two main areas: defending the values of nationalism and promoting the new 
reforms. The new overarching goal of the Turkish Hearth centered on educating the 
Turkish people on Turkish nationalism.271 
 
In 1924, the second article of the Turkish constitution stated the official purpose of 
the Turkish Hearth as working “to develop Turkish culture while strengthening 
national consciousness among all Turks, to work towards…cultural progress and 
towards the development of the national economy.”272 In the following three years 
the state took measures to scale back the Turkish Hearth’s activities and in 1927 
officially restricted its activities to the boundaries of the Republic.273 By 1931 the 
state officially disbanded the Turkish Hearth organization.274 The decision to shut 
down the Turkish Hearth organization represented an attempt to further eliminate 
pan-Turkist sentiments. Ironically, parallel to this the state began crafting the Turkish 
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History Thesis, which drew on a degree of pan-Turkist sentiments to rally citizens 
around Turkish national unity.  
 
The Turkish History Thesis tied Turks to their ancestors of Central Asia and made 
the claim that Turks were the first great civilization. It claimed all civilizations could 
be traced back to the Turks, except the Ottomans. The Thesis explained that Central 
Asia was not only the foundation of the Turks, but of all of humanity. From Central 
Asia, the Turks then spread across the world. The Thesis also argued that Anatolia 
was one of the most ‘racially pure’ areas of Turkishness. 275  This helped the 
Kemalists legitimize the foundation of the Republic as it created a strong link 
between the citizens and the land they inhabited.276 
 
This narrative decisively left out any ties to the Ottoman-Islamic past in an attempt to 
separate the Turks from the perceived failures of the former Empire. The references 
to the Ottomans that did appear painted them as responsible for breaking the Turks’ 
ties to the Western world, thus making Ottomans directly responsible for the 
Republic’s problems. 277 This narrative helped the Kemalists further legitimize their 
struggle against the Republic’s Ottoman-Islamic past and their insistence to 
eliminate all traces of it from the collective public consciousness.  
Education and Language 
 
The rapid spread of printed material helped facilitate the simplification of language, 
particularly during the late decades of the Ottoman Empire. Early attempts to reform 
the Empire’s written and spoken language began in 1911 with a literary group called 
the Young Pens (Genç Kalemler), who published a journal by the same name. Their 
goal was to eliminate the distinction between the Empire’s written and spoken 
language. Among the authors of the group’s journal was Ziya Gökalp. In the journal 
he opposed the continuation of separate spoken and written languages and 
advocated for the two to be condensed. As part of this plan he promoted the 
‘purification’ of the Turkish language. In his version of language purification, he 
called for the removal of some, but not all, foreign words.278 Efforts by the Genç 
Kalemler and other Ottoman intellectuals aimed at simplifying and reforming the 
language, not intervening in the structure of the state. This directly contrasted with 
the efforts of the Kemalists, who changed not only the Turkish language itself but 
also its symbolism and usage.  
 
The CUP attempted to push Ottoman Turkish on the Empire’s population through the 
Turkish Hearth. For the CUP though, language did not represent a prerequisite for 
identity in the same way the Kemalists’ new version of the Turkish language did. 
While the CUP pushed Turkish instruction and education on Ottoman subjects, it still 
permitted the establishment of some minority schools that provided language and 
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literature classes.279 The Kemalists not only pushed, but forcibly required subjects of 
the Republic to adopt and use the new Turkish language. In 1935 Prime Minister 
İsmet İnönü bluntly stated: “From now on, we will not keep quiet. All citizens, who 
live with us, will speak Turkish.”280  
 
Kemalists conceptions of nationalism had firm roots in language, culture and 
common ideals. Kemal and his associates emphasized the role language played in 
the new Republic and how the adoption of the Turkish language fit into national 
identity. The Turkish language became an integral part of Turkish national identity. 
Being Turkish meant speaking only Turkish, and non-Turkish speakers were viewed 
as foreigners in the eyes of the state:  
 
“One of the significant characteristics of the nation is language. One, who regards himself as 
a member of the Turkish nation, should first of all and in every case, speak Turkish. If, 
someone, who does not speak Turkish, claims membership to Turkish culture and 
community, it would not be right to believe this.”281  
 
One of the obvious qualities of nationality is language. He must first speak the Turkish 
language who says that he belongs to the Turkish nationality. If the one does not speak the 
Turkish language it is not true to believe that a person who claims his devotion to Turkish 
society and culture.282 
 
The issue of language was one of the areas where Gökalp, the proclaimed father of 
Turkish nationalism, and the Kemalists did not completely agree. The idea of 
reforming the Ottoman language had firm roots with the garbcılar. Both Cevdet and 
Nuri advocated for the adoption of the Latin alphabet during the Second 
Constitutional period of the Ottoman Empire. Gökalp, on the other hand, rejected the 
replacement of Arabic and Persian words with Turkish ones and only supported 
eliminating foreign words that existed alongside Turkish synonyms.283 He believed 
that eliminating Arabic and Persian would destroy the language and that all the 
imported words had already become Turkish since the Turks were using them. The 
Kemalists surpassed Gökalp’s ideas on language reform in choosing to discard all 
Arabic and Persian words and replace the Arabic script with the Latin alphabet.  
 
This move was in line with the Kemalists’ efforts to invoke a full-scale break from the 
Republic’s Islamic and Ottoman past. According to the Kemalists the Arabic script 
set Turkey apart from the West and remained a link to the Ottoman Empire. The 
Kemalists forced the new language on the country’s population suddenly and with 
minimal warning. Publications quickly appeared in the new language and the state 
implemented a ban on the printing of Arabic and Persian publications, including 
religious texts.284 Cities and towns received new, Turkish names. Street signs in the 
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new language appeared overnight and Turkish education began in state schools. 
The country had a mere six months to read, write and speak a new version of 
Turkish stripped of its Ottoman vocabulary and written in an unfamiliar script.285  
 
Accompanying legislation forbid the use of languages other than Turkish, preventing 
the Republic’s inhabitants from reading and writing the language of their Ottoman 
past. Those who did not read, write, and speak Turkish received fines and even 
punishments.286 The state also forced citizens to adopt Turkish surnames, mandated 
by the Law of Surnames passed in 1934.287 This reformation and use of the new 
Turkish language pushed the Republic further away from its Ottoman past and closer 
to a cohesive Turkish national identity, fostered by state intervention and restrictions.  
  
“Writing history is as important as making history.”  
– Mustafa Kemal Atatürk288  
 
Another important aspect of the Kemalist reform package was the rewriting of 
Turkish history. In the official narrative of the Kemalists, and largely by Kemal himself 
during his seven-day speech (Nutuk), Turkey was described as a brand new state 
with no ties to the former Ottoman Empire. The state claimed Turkey inherited 
nothing from the Ottoman period and described the Empire as “backwards.” In 
conjunction with this, Turkey was likened to a phoenix that had risen from the ashes 
of the deceased Empire.289  
 
The creation of a new Turkish history became one of the primary projects of the new 
Turkish state. Kemalist hand-picked scholars to write the Turkish History Thesis, 
which aimed to show that the Turks were and had always been a civilized nation and 
that they had priority over other ethnicities (namely Greeks and Armenians) in their 
Anatolian homeland.290 The goal was to make the history of the Turks known to the 
world and to serve as a source of national inspiration, especially for the Turkish 
youth. The Turkish History Thesis signified that Turkishness consisted of racial, 
ethnic, historical, and linguistic elements.  
Secularism 
 
The Kemalists’ secularizing reforms went far beyond those promoted by the CUP, 
and in some cases even by the garbcılar. Kemalist efforts went beyond separating 
state and religion, as the leaders of the Young Turk movement envisioned. The 
Kemalists aimed to also reduce the influence of religion from public life and placed 
religious institutions under the control of the state. Instead of attempting to eliminate 
religious influences, the state instead sought to give itself more control over religious 
influences. These efforts began in 1922 with the abolishment of the Sultanate and 
Caliphate, which the Kemalists saw as a lingering attachment to the Ottoman 
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Empire. The elimination of Islamic courts followed in 1924. The government then 
abolished the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations, replacing it with 
Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet Işleri Müdürlüğü) and the Directorate-
General for Pious Foundations (Evkaf Umum Müdürlüğü).291 The state tasked these 
Directorates with the “interpretation and execution of an enlightened version of the 
Islamic religion.”292  
 
In addition to eliminating and replacing religious institutions the state enacted 
measures to remove religious symbols from the public sphere. As recommended in 
the garbcılar’s Westernization plan, the state closed down all shrines (türbes) and 
dervishes (tekkes). Hospitals and social centers operated by religious organizations 
moved under the administration of the state.  The prohibition of the Ottoman fez and 
the adoption of the European calendar, Italian penal code, Swiss civil code and Latin 
alphabet all affected religion’s place in the Turks’ identity. Though symbolic and tied 
mostly to Westernization efforts, the adoption of these Western cultural and social 
elements also impacted the role of religion in Turkish society.  
 
Turkish national identity, and by extension Kemalism, attempted to fill the void Islam 
once occupied. In 1945 the Turkish Language Association even began defining 
religion as: “A strongly held idea or ideal. Kemalism is the religion of the Turk.”293 In 
many ways Kemalism became a political religion, which Mateescu explains as: 
 
…profoundly revolutionary—it arises in times of political collapse to build a new establishment 
on the ruins of a former one. It is also poised for an attack on the traditional religion aiming at 
either appropriating its domain or simply eliminating it from the public realm…A political 
religion revolves around the image of a charismatic leader whose name and image become 
associated with the deification of the state as defined by the revolutionary political 
establishment.294 
 
Indeed, Mateescu’s description of political religion can be directly applied to the 
example of Kemalism. The Kemalists capitalized on the religious void, which they 
intentionally exacerbated, hoping to fill it with Turkish national identity. Through a 
strategic combination of rapid, radical reforms the Kemalists promoted their Six 
Arrows, and particularly Turkish nationalism, at the expense of religion, and at times 
even as a religion. According to the Kemalists, Turkish nationalism was not only an 
integral part to a Turk’s identity, but it was something Turks should whole heartedly 
believe in.  
Conclusion  
 
The ideologies and policies of the Young Turks and the Kemalists certainly overlap; 
this thesis does not attempt to debate that statement. Instead, this thesis seeks to 
highlight the areas of discontinuity between the two movements and show that there 
is not a direct line between them. While both movements carried out similar policies, 
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their motivations for doing so differed. The extent to which they carried out these 
policies also differed. Moreover, if one were to trace the roots of Kemalist ideology 
and policies back to the Young Turk movement, this would point to a strong influence 
from the movement’s garbcılar faction versus its central leadership.  
 
Gökalp, often referenced in current scholarship as the ‘father of Turkish nationalism’, 
certainly influenced Kemalist ideology. Yet there are also areas where he diverged 
from Kemalist thought, such as the adoption of Western civilization and the inclusion 
of religion in Turkish identity. In these areas, we can see a stronger influence from 
the ideas of Cevdet and the garbcılar, whose beliefs arguably formed the basis for 
the radical measures put forth during the Kemalist era.  
 
The Young Turk movement’s preservationist mindset directly contrasted with the 
creationist mindset of the Kemalist nationalist movement, which strived to construct a 
new homeland out of the ruins of the crumbling Ottoman Empire. Had the CUP 
leadership remained in power and successfully overcome the challenges of World 
War I, it is unclear how they would have chosen to continue running the Empire. It 
can be assumed from the ideological shifts occurring at that time that the CUP would 
have continued efforts to forcefully and violently homogenize the remaining Ottoman 
population and enforce a shared identity, but the extent and speed at which they 
would have done this remains unknown. Since the CUP’s central leadership did not 
agree with the stances of the garbcılar, which influenced the radical reforms of the 
Kemalists, it is unlikely that its future measures would have mirrored those of the 
Kemalists. 
 
In conclusion, the links between the two movements are extremely complex and 
cannot be summarized as merely a continuation from one to the other. As this thesis 
has attempted to highlight, there were links to different groups within the Young Turk 
movement as well as discontinuities between the ideologies and policies of each 
movement. Kemalist ideology can certainly be traced back to many ideas that gained 
prominence in the Young Turk era, but it is necessary to dig deeper to show the links 
between specific ideas, individuals and time periods. This thesis hopes to shed light 
on the need for further scholarship on these discontinuities and the reasons behind 
them. 
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Appendix 
 
Turkish Translations 
 
Türkçe      English 
 
Ahali Fırkası      People’s Party 
Altı Ok      Six Arrows (of Kemalism) 
Amasya Genelgesi     Amasya Circular  
Atatürkçülük      Kemalism 
Aydınlar      Intellectuals  
Cumhuriyetçilik     Republicanism   
  
Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası    Republican People’s Party 
Devletçilik      Statism/Etatism     
Devlet-i Osmaniye     Ottoman State 
Devrimcilik      Revolutionism/Reformism    
Diyanet Işleri Müdürlüğü Directorate for Religious Affairs   
Dokuz Umde      Nine Principles 
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Evkaf Umum Müdürlüğü  Directorate-General for Pious 
Foundations   
Fedakâran-ı Millet Cemiyeti   National Unionist Federation 
Garbcılar      Westernists 
Garbcılık      Westernization  
Halkçilik      Populism    
Halk Evleri      People’s Houses   
  
Halk Fırkası      People’s Party 
Halk Odaları      People’s Rooms  
Hars       Culture 
Hakimiyet-i Osmaniye    Ottoman Rule 
Heyet-i Müttefika-i Osmaniye   Ottoman Committee of Alliance 
Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası    Freedom and Accord Party (Liberal  
Union, Liberal Entente) 
İskan Kanunu     Resettlement Law 
İslahat-ı Esasiye-i Osmaniye Fırkası  Ottoman Fundamental Reform Party 
İslamcılık      Islamism 
İttihad-ı Muhammedi Fırkası   Mohammadin Union 
Ittihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti    Society of Ottoman Union 
İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti    Committee of Union and Progress  
(CUP) 
Irk       Race 
Jön Türkler      Young Turks 
Katib-i Umumi      General Secretary  
Kemalizm      Kemalism 
Köy Enstitüleri     Village Institutes   
Kurtuluş Savaşı     Liberation War  
Laiklik       Secularism 
Medeni      Civilized  
Medeniyet      Civilization 
Merkez-i Umumi     Central Committee 
Millet       Nation (also: group organized by  
religion) 
Milli       National 
Milliyetçilik      Nationalism    
Mutedil Hürriyetperveran Fırkası   Moderate Liberal Party 
Milli Mücadele      National Struggle 
Misak-ı Milli      National Pact 
Muasir      Modern 
Muasirlaşmak     Modernity, Civilization  
Osmanlı Ahrar Fırkası    Ottoman Liberal Union 
Osmanlı Demokrat Fırkası    Ottoman Democratic Party 
Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti    Ottoman Freedom Society 
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu    Ottoman Empire  
Osmanlı Sosyalist Fırkası    Ottoman Socialist Party 
Osmanlıca      Ottoman (language) 
Öz Türkler      True Turks 
Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası   Free Republican Party  
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Tehcir Kanunu     Relocation Law  
Terakki      Progress 
Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası   Progressive Republican Party 
Teşkilat-i Mahsusa     Special Organization 
Türkiye      Turkey 
Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi   Turkish Grand National Assembly 
Türk Derneği      Turkish Association 
Türk Ocağı      Turkish Hearth 
Türk Yurdu      Turkish Homeland 
Türklük      Turkishness 
Türkçulük      Turkism 
Vatan       Country 
 
 
 
 
